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Should Tort Law Protect Property
Against Accidental Loss?
RICHARD L. ABEL*
Tort damages for accidental harm to property violate the funda-
mental values of autonomy, equality, and community. Tort law
itself recognizes that property is less important than personal in-
tegrity. State action, including judicial decisionmaking, that seeks
to protect property against inadvertent damage either is unprinci-
pled and hence arbitrary or reflects and reinforces the existing dis-
tribution of wealth and power, or both. Tort liability for acciden-
tal injury to property cannot be defended as a means of reducing
secondary accident costs, it entails very high transaction costs, and
it has little or no proven value as a deterrent of careless behavior.
Consequently, courts should cease to recognize a cause of action
in tort for accidental damage to property.
t An earlier version of this Article was presented to the Symposium of the Colston
Research Society at the University of Bristol, April 3-6, 1984. It will appear in THE LAW
OF TORT (M.P. Furmston ed. 1986). I am grateful to the participants in that symposium,
my colleagues at UCLA, at William Whitford, for their comments on that draft.
Virtually all the tort law I know, and therefore all the case citations in this Article, come
from the casebook with which I teach, M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN. TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES (3d ed. 1983), and the two earlier editions. I am grateful to the editors
for their thoughtful and comprehensive compilation, although they bear no responsibility
for the conclusions I draw and would, I am sure, be horrified by many of them.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. B.A., Harvard Univer-
sity, 1962; J.D., Columbia University, 1965; Ph.D., University of London, 1974.
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INTRODUCTION
Tort law protects two distinct kinds of interest: personal integrity
(which includes both physical and emotional well-being) and prop-
erty. When these interests are invaded, damages are awarded: for
pain and suffering, medical expenses, and past and future property
losses (that is, reduction in the value of property by reason of physi-
cal damage or other cause, lost wages, and lost profits). Recent de-
velopments have extended the protection of tort law in the areas of
nuisance and damages for economic loss. This Article questions
whether tort law should protect any property interests against unin-
tentional interference. My argument will proceed as follows. Previ-
ously I have insisted that our primary goal in confronting risks to
personal integrity should be to control them rather than to compen-
sate the victims or punish the tortfeasors after the fact. Any encoun-
ter with the risks that remain ought to be as autonomous and equal
as possible.' Now I will explore how best we may realize the values
of autonomy, equality, and community in confronting the risk of
damage to property. I also have argued previously that violations of
personal integrity we cannot or will not eliminate demand a social
welfare scheme ensuring adequate medical care and some minimum
level of income maintenance, regardless of how those needs arise.2
Now I will examine both the distributional and the symbolic conse-
quences of extending such protection to property damage. I will try
to show that the present regime of tort law recognizes the fundamen-
tal difference between personal integrity and property damage, and
is far more solicitous of the former. I will also argue that state action
protecting property against unintentional loss, whether through tort
law or other mechanisms, inevitably has unequal and arbitrary ef-
fects. Therefore, I conclude, the values of autonomy, equality and
community, together with the principled exercise of state power
which is the minimum condition of justice, can be advanced only if
tort law ceases to protect property against accidental injury.
Let me begin by sketching the legal and empirical dimensions of
the phenomenon I am examining. Property loss includes physical
damage to property or impairment of its value (car crashes, house
fires, the siting of a cement factory next to a residential community,
a truck that will not run smoothly); past and future wage losses,
1. Abel, A Socialist Approach to Risk, 41 MD. L. REv. 695, 702-19 (1982).
2. Abel, A Critique of American Tort Law, 8 BRIT. J. L. & Soc'y 199, 210-11
(1981). In the present Article, I assume the existence of a welfare scheme extending to
certain other minimum entitlements, such as housing and transportation, and, under
some circumstances, entailing the ownership of a home and an automobile. Until society
guarantees these minimum entitlements, I strongly favor the preservation, and indeed the
expansion, of tort liability and damages, and I readily grant that any reduction would be
regressive.
80
[VOL. 23: 79, 1986] Accidental Property Loss
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
whether suffered as a result of physical disability or through some
other impediment (a salesperson's car that will not function, an in-
ability to get to work because a bridge collapsed, the closure of an
employer's factory); past and future lost profits (because capital or
labor has been damaged physically, natural resources have been im-
paired, or transportation has been interrupted); and disappointment
of more speculative expectations (such as the appreciation of an in-
vestment or an expectation of inheritance). Although it is impossible
to estimate the value of most of these losses, we do have some data
concerning the physical destruction of property and the amount of
wages lost through injury or illness.a A variety of sources suggest
that these two items represent at least half of all accidental loss and
cost tens of billions of dollars a year in the United States. The an-
nual estimates by the National Safety Council consistently show that
wage loss and property damage account for the bulk of all accident
costs. In comparison, medical expenses typically represent only thir-
teen to twenty-five percent of total losses.' Although medical ex-
penses are twice the value of lost wages in small cases (economic loss
less than $5000 in 1971 dollars), this relationship is reversed in seri-
ous cases (economic loss greater than $25,000), where wage and
property losses constituted fifty-seven percent and medical expenses
3. Crimes of violence as well as property crimes inflict property losses on their
victims. See A. LINDEN, THE REPORT OF THE OSGOODE HALL STUDY ON COMPENSATION
FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME 11-15 (1968).
4.
NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS (1970-1980)
Costs of Accidents (billions of dollars)
Medical Insurance Automobile Fire
Expenses Administrative Property Loss
Loss Wage Costs Damage
$ % $ % $ % $ % $ %
1980 22.7 33 10.3 15 16.6 24 13.4 19 6.2 9
1979 20.9 33 9.2 15 15.1 24 12.1 19 5.8 9
1978 19.3 33 8.4 14 14.1 24 11.6 20 4.7 8
1977 18.3 35 7.5 14 12.3 23 10.1 19 4.5 9
1976 16.1 36 6.9 15 8.7 19 8.9 20 4.3 10
1975 15.4 38 6.2 15 6.3 16 8.0 20 4.2 10
1974 13.2 36 5.7 16 7.4 20 6.5 18 3.7 10
1970 7.2 31 2.9 13 5.9 26 4.7 20 2.3 10
Note: Percentage calculated on the basis of total of these rows, which omits indirect loss
from work accidents.
In a 1958 Michigan study, the following were the proportions of loss for serious auto-
mobile accidents (three weeks of hospitalization or more than $500 in medical expenses
or death or permanent impairment) and for all accidents.
thirty-eight percent of total costs.5 Examining the same issue from
the perspective of the insurers, seventy-five percent of their premi-
ums pertain to property loss and only twenty-five percent to personal
injury.6 Likewise, under no-fault systems, wage losses exceed medi-
cal costs in both workers' compensation7 and automobile accident
schemes. 8 Pain and suffering is a trivial proportion of all but the
largest tort judgments: only sixteen percent of the net recovery by
victims in that half of all automobile accidents in New York City
involving only slight shock and contusions." Although comparable
data from the United Kingdom are unavailable, a Royal Commission
study confirmed that wage losses are substantial. The Pearson report
found that ninety-two percent of all those injured between June 1972
Type of Damages All Accidents Serious Accidents
Income Loss (past and future) 51% 67%
Expenses incurred 45 28
Property Damage 21 5
Medical and burial 16 14
Cost of seeking compensation 7 7
Other 1 2
Expected future expenses 4 6
Medical 3 4
Other 1 2
(N=$178.2 million) (N=$111.4 million)
A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, JR., C. VOLTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE Acci-
DENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATIONS 142,
165 (1964).
Wages are about three-quarters and medical expenses about a quarter of all losses in
automobile accidents, products liability cases, and medical malpractice claims.
O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal Injury Claims by
Defendant's Prompt Tender of Claimant's Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 589,
597 n.46 (1982).
In the Netherlands, two-thirds of a sample of 1000 traffic accident cases in 1967-68
dealt with damage to the car alone. A. BLOEMBERGEN, J. HERS VAN OVERN, P. VINKE &
P. VAN WERSCH, DUIZEND BOTSINGEN: EEN KWANTITATIVE ANALYZE VAN CIVIELF
RECHTBANKVONNISSEN IN VERKEERSZAKEN (1972) [hereinafter cited as A.
BLOEMBERGEN].
5. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPEN-
SATION IN THE U.S.: A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 31-52 (1971).
Jeffrey O'Connell reaches somewhat different conclusions from the same source, al-
though the relative magnitudes of the various categories are roughly similar. In one book
he states that wage and property losses account for 79% of all damage while medical
expenses account for only 18%. J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY 75 (1975). In
another book O'Connell states that 46% of compensable damage is injury to property,
40% is wage loss, and 12% is medical expenses. J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY
AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE 143 n.8 (1971).
6. J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN 165
(1979).
7. Medical expenses are one-third of benefits. R. CHELIUS, WORKPLACE SAFETY
AND HEALTH: THE ROLE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 20-28 (1977).
8. Widiss, Bovjerg & Cavers, The Massachusetts Study, in NO-FAULT AUTO-
MOBILE INSURANCE IN ACTION: THE EXPERIENCES IN MASSACHUSETTS, FLORIDA, DELA-
WARE AND MICHIGAN 203-06 (1977).
9. R. HUNTING & G. NEUWIRTH. WHO SUES IN NEW YORK CITY? A STUDY OF
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT CLAIMS (1962).
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and June 1975 were absent from work for more than a week, fifty-
four percent for more than two weeks, twenty-six percent for more
than four, and ten percent for more than nine. 10 Injured workers lost
an average of £189 (in 1973 pounds), but twenty-seven percent lost
more than £200 and 7.7% more than £500.11 Despite the inade-
quacy, inaccuracy, and incomparability of these figures, they amply
demonstrate that property damage, broadly conceived, accounts for
the bulk of all accidental losses, greatly overshadowing medical ex-
penses and pain and suffering. Property damage, therefore, is of suf-
ficient economic importance to justify serious examination.
PROMOTING AUTONOMY, EQUALITY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE
CONFRONTATION WITH RISK
Autonomy
In a previous article I argued that the right to personal integrity is
so fundamental that we are entitled to confront the risk of its viola-
tion as autonomously and equally as possible. 2 Here I want to con-
sider what respect for those values implies in the confrontation with
threat of accidental loss to property. Physical and emotional integ-
rity clearly are essential attributes of being; their violation threatens
the very core of selfhood. Therefore it is paramount that the individ-
ual should enjoy the greatest .possible autonomy in confronting the
possibility of such loss. In order to achieve that autonomy with re-
spect to risks encountered in the workplace, I argued that workers
had to acquire full ownership and control.
Is dominion over property integral to selfhood in the same way? I
believe it is not. We view concern about personal safety as a healthy
expression of indispensable egoism, although we know that this con-
cern can become cowardice, hypochondria, and phobia when exag-
gerated. We have a more critical attitude toward attachment to
property. These attachments often are associated with antisocial
10. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL
INJURY, II REPORT 12 (1978) (Cmnd. 7054-1) [hereinafter cited as ROYAL COMMIS-
SION]. Road accidents causing only property damage are six times as common as those
that also cause some physical injury, however slight. P. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSA-
TION AND THE LAW 220 (1970). In a recent survey of the clients of a program intended
to reach personal injury victims who ordinarily do not seek compensation, 55% were af-
fected by their injuries for more than two months and three-quarters for more than a
month. H. GENN, MEETING LEGAL NEEDS? 17 (1982).
11. ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 10, at 112.
12. Abel, supra note 1.
greed, miserliness, and neurotic obsession.13 Every society accords re-
spect to individuals who are unencumbered and unconcerned with
property-Christian saints, Indian holy men, Bohemian artists.
Many societies regard asceticism as an important ideal, if not one
that every person can attain. No society extols similar disregard for
personal integrity, although it may idealize a particular individual
who sacrifices his or her own life to save another. Consistent indiffer-
ence to personal safety is associated with immaturity, alcoholism,
drug addiction, and insanity. We can understand the deliberate de-
struction of property in pursuit of profit-such as arson committed
on an overinsured building of diminishing value-though we may
punish it as fraud. After all, how different is such an act from the
continual destruction of both the natural and the constructed envi-
ronment in the name of progress? But we find it hard to comprehend
self-mutilation except as a means of avoiding even greater threats to
autonomy-service in the Czarist army, for instance."4 A staple of
13. We may make an exception for property that represents an extension of self
through the exercise of personal labor and creativity, works of art, the creation of home
or garden-or perhaps a customized car. We feel differently about the accumulation of
wealth or the consumer goods that wealth can buy, whether these are fungible mass
products or unique "collectibles."
One of the very few American cases granting damages for emotional loss caused by
accidental injury to property concerned a home the owners had built themselves. See
Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). Certainly we recognize that
intentional destruction of property can be perceived as a personal assault by both aggres-
sor and victim. In the film Shoot the Moon (Metro Goldwyn Meyer Productions 1981),
the estranged husband returns to the family home to find himself supplanted by a young
contractor his wife has hired to build a tennis court. He responds by destroying the tennis
court with his automobile, which in turn drives the contractor to physical violence.
Margaret Radin has offered a subtly nuanced distinction between property she associ-
ates with personhood and merely fungible property, by arguing that the former deserves
greater protection. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982). Ra-
din is almost exclusively concerned with intentional invasions of property rights, where I
agree such a distinction is helpful. With respect to unintentional invasions, however, I
believe we best can protect what she calls "personal" property by guaranteeing individu-
als the resources necessary to purchase what society judges to be the minimum entitle-
ment to necessities.
14. In this respect American capitalism may have achieved a debasement of
human autonomy comparable to that found in pre-revolutionary Russia (or among pau-
pers in medieval Europe or third-world countries today), for Americans also mutilate
themselves, not to evade the grasp of autocratic power but in a cruel parody of capitalist
greed. A Californian recently had two of his companions hack off his leg with an axe in
order to simulate a motorcycle accident and collect insurance. See also J. O'CONNELL,
supra note 6, at 16-17. More comprehensible was the suicide of a 42-year-old man who
had squandered some $600,000 his father had sent from Iran to invest in preparation for
the day when the father emigrated. Learning that his father finally was planning to move
to the United States, the son took out a one million dollar double indemnity life insur-
ance policy, left a set of elaborate hints that his life was threatened by terrorists, and
then blew himself up with an explosive in his car. L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 1984, § II, at 1,
col. I.
It is, perhaps, quintessentially American to simulate injuries. In a nice example of the
exploiters exploited, three Los Angeles men have been charged with securing advances of
thousands of dollars for living and medical expenses from personal injury plaintiff's attor-
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slapstick comedy is the destruction of property, such as chairs, vio-
lins, cars, houses. But the dismemberment or destruction of a person
never is comic, except in cartoons where the victim always is miracu-
lously made whole again. We cannot imagine a society that deprives
individuals of all control over the personal risks to which they are
exposed, although we do tolerate some restrictions. But would we
view holding property at one's own risk as an equal affront to human
autonomy? This seems much more a distributional ques-
tion-whether to make property owners richer or poorer-than a
matter of ultimate values.15 Indeed, we can take this argument fur-
neys to whom they told fictitious stories of having been involved in automobile accidents.
The suspects would go to a law firm alleging to have been involved in a very
serious accident. They would describe the horrid details, provide names of
those injured or killed .... One attorney told us these people were so con-
vincing they should have won Academy Awards for their performances, right
down to the teary eyes .... Sometimes they would go in with plaster casts on
their legs or their arms, or even on crutches.
L.A. Times, Nov. J0, 1983, § II, at 1, col. -1.
Fraudulent misrepresentation of physical disabilities in order to evade military service
is humorous, even vaguely commendable, as in T. MANN, CONFESSIONS OF FELIX KRULL,
CONFIDENCE MAN (THE EARLY YEARS) 80-101 (1969). Yet no simulation was involved
when an American physician proposed to open a market for transplant organs through
which people could sell their kidneys, etc.
Dr. H. Barry Jacobs of Reston, Va., has proposed setting up a company to buy
kidneys and sell them to persons in need of healthy organs. Jacobs, who was
convicted and served 10 months in jail on a 1977 mail fraud charge involving
Medicare and Medicaid payments, said in a recent interview that his idea is "a
very lucrative potential business." "If the 'haves' want it, they'll have to pay. If
the 'have-nots' want it, they'll have to pay too."
L.A. Times, Sept. 24, 1983, § I, at 5, col. 1.
15. The nature of this choice is nicely captured by two New York cases, sepa-
rated by a quarter of a century, in which the victim sought to impose strict liability upon
the tortfeasor for engaging in an ultrahazardous activity. In the first, which rejected
liability (for property damage), the court wrote:
By becoming a member of civilized society, I am compelled to give up many of
my natural rights, but I receive more than a compensation from the surrender
by every other man of the same rights, and the security, advantage and protec-
tion which the laws give me. So, too, the general rules that I may have the
exclusive and undisturbed use and possession of my real estate, and that I must
so use my real estate as not to injure my neighbor, are much modified by the
exigencies of the social state.
Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484 (1873).
In the second case, which imposed liability, the court responded by invoking
The principle, founded in public policy, that the safety of property generally is
superior in right to a particular use of a single piece of property by its owner.
It renders the enjoyment of all property more secure by preventing such a use
of one piece by one man as may injure all his neighbors . . . . The safety of
travelers upon the public highway is more important to the state than the im-
provement of one piece of property, by a special method, is to its owner.
Sullivan v. Dunham, 161 N.Y. 290, 300, 55 N.E. 923, 926 (1900). It may be significant
ther and consider whether it might violate the autonomy of those
who do not own property to compel them to take care of and pay for
damage to property owned by others. In an earlier article, I argued
that the values of autonomy and equality could be reconciled despite
the apparent tension between them. 16 Here I suggest that extending
negligence law to unequally distributed property is unacceptable be-
cause it infringes the autonomy of those who own little or no
property.
Exposing property to the risk of accidental injury may not violate
autonomy because owners may wish to express that autonomy by
placing their property at risk. A similar argument often is advanced
with respect to personal integrity. Economists insist that the world is
made up of risk-averse and risk-preferential individuals and that the
latter enjoy subjecting themselves to the risk of bodily harm (or at
least mind it less than the former). 17 Certainly there are realms of
behavior in which many of us take pleasure from activities involving
some degree of risk. Recreational pursuits offer many examples, al-
though I would argue that our enjoyment would be enhanced, not
diminished, by reducing or even eliminating the risk. 8 Furthermore,
there may be a few individuals, such as Houdini or Evel Knievel,
who like to court danger in everything they do. I tend to be skepti-
cal, however, about the economist's "risk preferrer," especially in en-
vironments where choice clearly is constrained, such as the work-
place and the marketplace for many consumer goods. Workers
expose themselves to carcinogens not because carcinogens add spice
to their work but because the workers have no other way to earn a
living (or at least as good a living) and a superior has ordered the
workers to submit to the exposure. I drive my car to the shopping
center not because I like to dodge the crazies on the freeway but
because Los Angeles has woefully inadequate public transportation.
When we turn from personal integrity to property, however, I find
the construct of a "homo aleator"' 9 a good deal more plausible.
that the injury in the second case was death rather than property damage, although other
cases do protect property against ultrahazardous activities.
16. See Abel, supra note 1, at 718-19.
17. Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L.
REV. 643, 656-57 (1978).
18. The United States Parachute Association has a membership of 17,000, which
it estimates represents about half of all active divers in the country. Last year there were
three million jumps and 29 recorded fatalities. Interviews with sky divers suggest that
they would jump more often, and others would join them, if the sport could be rendered
safer. L.A. Times, Dec. 6, 1983, § I, at 3, col. 4.
19. "Risk-taking person;" I offer this neologism by analogy to the "homo
economicus" who always maximizes utility, the "reasonable person" beloved of torts, and
the "homo sociologicus" who always obeys role expectations. For the origin of the last,
see R. Dahrendorf, Homo Sociologicus: On the History, Significance, and Limits of the
Category of Social Role, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF SOCIETY (1968).
[VOL. 23: 79. 1986] Accidental Property Loss
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Many people enjoy the speculative pursuit of wealth, whether this
means buying a lottery ticket, collecting supermarket stamps in the
hope of winning a prize, feeding quarters into a slot machine, or
buying and selling stocks.20 Here there is none of the compulsion
that constrains the worker, or the consumer dependent on necessities
in an economy characterized by extreme division of labor.
Earlier I argued that autonomy in the confrontation with risks
threatening personal integrity required fundamental social
change-worker ownership and control of the means of production
and collectivization of consumption. But I do not see that value as
mandating or even justifying collective intervention in the confronta-
tion with risks to property.2 First, accidental damage to property
does not violate the core of being. Hence the value of autonomy does
not require that tort law protect property against accidental loss.
Second, there are situations in which people actually choose to place
their property at risk, and respect for their autonomy may require
that we allow them to bear their losses.22 Furthermore, as I shall
argue later, it is difficult to identify these situations. The most that
can be deduced from autonomy, therefore, is that it fails to provide
arguments for tort liability. Arguments against liability turn on
other values.
Equality
The second value by which I believe the encounter with risk
should be judged is equality.23 When personal integrity is
threatened, equality is simply a recognition of our common human-
ity. We readily acknowledge the imperative of equality when the risk
is extreme, public, and widely shared-as in compulsory military
service during wartime. Few would argue that exemptions from mili-
tary service should be sold or substitutes purchased, as occurred in
nineteenth-century Europe and America. Indeed, we remain quite
uncomfortable about the extent to which class, ethnicity, and gender
20. For an account of professional poker players, see A. ALVAREZ, THE BIGGEST
GAME IN TOWN (1983); for traders on the futures market, see N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1983,
§ 6 (Magazine) at 8, 71; N. KLEINFIELD, THE TRADERS (1984). The authors clearly
admire their subjects.
21. Abel, supra note 1, at 719-51.
22. For a discussion of the arguments for allowing what he calls "option luck" to
affect the allocation of resources, especially against claims of equality, see Dworkin,
What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS
283, 292-95 (1981).
23. For a fuller development of this argument, see Abel, supra note 1, at 710-17.
correlate with the incidence of military service and casualty rates.
There is widespread revulsion when wealth and poverty determine
entitlement to health and safety, for example when the poor are de-
nied medical care or when the market allocates human organs for
transplantion, as occurs in Brazil and has been proposed by an
American physican. 24 Our tort law is solicitous of those who are un-
usually susceptible to physical injury because their disabilities make
it difficult for them to exercise the average degree of care for them-
selves (for example, infants, the blind). Additionally, an injury that
would be trivial for the ordinary person has much more serious
repercussions for hemophiliacs or those prone to schizophrenia. We
individualize the standard of care which the former must display 5
and compensate the latter in full for their aggravated injuries.2" In
other words, we respect the fundamental human equality that under-
lies superficial physical or psychological differences by treating une-
quals unequally rather than by responding with a mechanical uni-
formity that would compound the inequality.
If our common humanity mandates that personal risk should be
distributed equally (and redistributed if necessary to achieve such
equality), enormous disparities in the enjoyment of property argue
against protecting it "equally." The distinction between the essential
equality of people, which demands an equal response, and the ine-
quality of property, which warrants different responses, is nicely il-
lustrated in The Merchant of Venice. Shylock commands the sympa-
thy of all listeners when he denounces Antonio for treating him
(unequally) as a Jew:
Hath not a Jew eyes? hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses,
affections, passions? fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons,
subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled
by the same winter and summer, as a Christian is? If you prick us, do we
not bleed? if you tickle us, do we not laugh? if you poison us, do we not
die?27
But he forfeits that sympathy by what follows: "if you wrong us,
shall we not revenge?" '28 The injustice of his position becomes obvi-
ous the more he presses his legal rights ("I crave the law,/The pen-
24. Id. at 715 nn.88-89; see also supra note 13.
25. See, e.g., Peterson v. Taylor, 316 N.W.2d 869 (Iowa 1982) (age); Mochen v.
State, 43 A.D.2d 484, 352 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1974) (insanity). We do not, however, adjust
the standard of care to the wealth or poverty of the actor. In Denver & Rio Grande R.R.
v. Peterson, 30 Colo. 77, 88, 69 P. 578, 581 (1902), the court acknowledged that "It]he
care required of a warehouseman is the same, whether he be rich or poor."
26. See e.g., Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970) (schizo-
phrenia). The law is not equally solicitous of property damage. See infra note 106 and
accompanying text.
27. W. SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, *act III, scene 1, lines 54-61.
28. Id. at *act III, scene 1, lines 61-62.
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alty and forfeit of my bond") 29 with the apparent, but actually
treacherous, support of Portia: "there is no power in Venice/Can al-
ter a decree established:/Twill be recorded for a precedent,/And
many an error by the same example/Will rush into the state."3 0 It is
clear Shylock has no moral claim to the legal penalty for Antonio's
failure to pay his debt, and even his legal right is fatally compro-
mised. He cannot justify violating Antonio's bodily integrity by in-
voking his own mere property loss.
For a regime to respond equally to legal subjects who are grossly
unequal is to reproduce that inequality, both materially and symboli-
cally. This is one of the classic dilemmas of liberal thought, which
condemns state sanctioned inequality while condoning inequality in
civil society. Just as both rich and poor are forbidden to sleep under
the bridges of the Seine, so the law extends to both its protection of
their Rolls Royces against automobile crashes, their mansions
against accidental fires, their hunting meets against any behavior
that might reduce the population of foxes, and their speculations in
the market for old masters against the negligence of an art consult-
ant who fails to spot a forgery. In doing so, it translates inequality in
one realm (property ownership) into inequality in another (the exer-
cise of state power)3 1 Nor can the victim base a claim to protection
on the fact that the risk to which he is exposed is not reciprocal,3 2
for the asymmetry is attributable not to the behavior of the causal
agent but rather to privileges enjoyed by the person who suffers
property loss. Earlier I argued that equality in confronting risks
which threaten personal integrity required a breakdown in the divi-
sion of labor through job sharing and job rotation in the workplace
and equalization of income and wealth in the marketplace.3 3 For the
same reasons I conclude that we best can promote equality in the
confrontation with risks threatening property simply by refusing to
protect property against accidental damage.3 4 Or, to put the same
29. Id. at *act IV, scene 1, lines 203-04.
30. Id. at *act IV, scene 1, lines 216-19.
31. M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
(1983).
32. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
33. See Abel, supra note 1.
34. Property losses suffered by the poor will affect them more severely than those
suffered by the rich, thereby aggravating inequality if left uncompensated. Poor people
are likely to invest higher proportions of both net worth and income in material property,
which can be destroyed physically, whereas the wealthy may have a higher proportion in
savings, stocks and bonds, etc. My response would be social insurance guaranteeing a
minimum income and other necessities (housing, car), which would protect the poor but
point differently, the value of equality can justify protecting property
only when that property is distributed equally.
Community
In my earlier article, I did not explicitly identify community as a
value by which to assess the confrontation with risk. I did, however,
endorse collective forms of production and consumption (worker and
consumer cooperatives), which clearly embody that value. The three
values are interdependent: individuals must feel autonomous and
equal before they can begin to create a community, while only
through collective action can autonomy and equality be preserved.
Like the other two values, community also has different implications
for threats to personal integrity and to property. It is only with re-
spect to our shared humanity that "no man is an Rand, intire of it
selfe" 35 or "a wrong to one is a wrong to all." 36 Risks to which all
are exposed equally evoke a powerful sense of community, which is
expressed in the collective response to such injuries after they occur.
Consider the virtually unlimited resources society devotes to rescuing
an identifiable individual trapped in a mine or cave, at sea or on a
mountain, 37 or the generosity a community shows when its members
have suffered in a flood, an explosion, or a fire.38 A further example
would be the spontaneous outpouring of gifts, both prevent-
ative-when a child needs an expensive operation in order to
live-and consolatory-after a family has experienced a tragedy,
such as the death of a member.
Risk or damage to mere property does not elicit this powerful
sense of community.39 One reason may be that property is not
viewed as an extension of self. Thus, observers do not experience the
threat empathetically as endangering the shared humanity that is
the bedrock of community. Indeed, insofar as property ownership ex-
presses the self, it accentuates individuality and thus undermines
community. Individuals who have isolated themselves from others by
conspicuously enjoying the privileges of property hardly can make a
not the wealthy.
35. J. Donne, Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions (1625), quoted in E. HEMING-
WAY, FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS (epigraph) (1940).
36. See A. DUMAS, THE THREE MUSKETEERS (1844).
37. G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALY-
sis 25 n.3 (1970).
38. K. ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH: DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE
BUFFALO CREEK FLOOD (1976); A. BARTON, COMMUNITIES IN DISASTER (1969); A.
WALLACE, TORNADO IN WORCESTER (1956); S. PERRY, E. SILBER & D. BLOCH, THE
CHILD AND His FAMILY IN DISASTER (1956); S. PRINCE, CATASTROPHE AND SOCIAL
CHANGE (1920); Kutak, The Sociology of Crises: The Louisville Flood of 1937, 17 So-
CIAL FORCES 66 (1938); Fritz, Disaster, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS (Merton
and Nisbet ed. 1961); M. WOLFENSTEIN, DISASTER: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ESSAY (1957).
39. But see infra the important qualification in note 42 and accompanying text.
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convincing claim that those others should protect or restore the dam-
aged property in order to preserve those privileges. Because the une-
qual distribution of property also subverts community, a collectivity
would be engaging in self-destructive activity if it sought to perpetu-
ate that inequality. Indeed, when a privileged person suffers property
loss, thereby reducing previous inequalities, the response often is in-
difference, or even ill-disguised satisfaction, rather than sympathy.40
It is revealing that cartoons of tophatted stockbrokers jumping to
their deaths from Wall Street skyscrapers following the crash of
1929 are intended to be, and are read as being, humorous, though
nobody otherwise would laugh at the plight of physical injury. Acts
of personal or group sacrifice to save another are viewed as expres-
sions of altruism. In these situations, asking for compensation, even
accepting it, would be unseemly, though social recognition certainly
is appropriate. People are much less willing to risk their lives or even
their property to protect the property of another. If they do so and
suffer loss in the process, they feel perfectly justified in claiming
compensation.41 Threats to property or loss of property elicit a col-
lective response only where the values of autonomy and equality also
are respected: for instance, where the property is an extension of self
(a home, a family farm, a kibbutz), and the circumstances of the
victim are similar to those of the people who come to the victim's
rescue or relief.42 Conversely, it is noteworthy that even the most
advanced welfare states do not offer collective protection to inequali-
ties of property. Furthermore, when disaster aid for property damage
is dispensed, there always is a ceiling on what can be claimed.43
40. A recurrent theme in literature is a privileged character, estranged from a
loved one or community by reason of that privilege, who loses everything and is reunited
with the other or the community. M. DRABBLE, THE NEEDLE'S EYE (1972), with its bibli-
cal title, is an example (though there the heroine gives away her wealth). C. DICKENS, A
CHRISTMAS CAROL (1843) reflects a similar theme.
41. See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221
(1910). What is deemed property may depend upon cultural elements. Recently, Ameri-
can newspapers reported a tragedy in which a dog was washed into a heavy sea at an
English resort, and several people drowned in efforts to save it. The American press
viewed the behavior of the rescuers as bizarre, whereas it was clear that English senti-
ment found such heroism admirable.
42. The history of the American frontier is full of such incidents. The children's
books of Laura Ingalls Wilder, for instance, offer many such examples. On another fron-
tier, Amos Oz's story, A Hollow Stone, describes the response of other kibbutzim and
the kibbutz movement when one of them is devastated by an unusual windstorm. See Oz,
A Hollow Stone, in WHERE THE JACKALS HOWL AND OTHER STORIES (1981).
43. Butler & Doessel, Natural Disaster Relief and Horizontal Equalization in
Australia, 13 PUBLIUS 55 (1983). Many no-fault schemes for compensating automobile
accidents or injuries at work impose a ceiling on the amount of income loss they will
Thus I conclude that communities feel no responsibility to protect
inequalities of property from accidental loss or to restore them after
the fact. Any effort to do so only undermines the sense of
community.
COMPENSATING THE VICTIMS OF ACCIDENTAL PROPERTY DAMAGE
The previous discussion assumed tacitly that preventing loss is
more important than compensating the victim, because it is impossi-
-ble to restore to the status quo ante someone who has suffered physi-
cal or emotional injury. In these situations, money damages are a
very inadequate substitute. The same is not true of property loss.
Money is a perfectly acceptable replacement unless the damaged
property is unique (a dwindling category in our mass consumer soci-
ety). Therefore it makes sense to be more concerned with compen-
sating the victims of accidental property loss and less concerned with
reducing property damage to some optimum level44 or with redistrib-
uting the irreducible residual risk so that those exposed to it are au-
tonomous, equal, and communal. In any case, this question has to be
asked with respect to losses that continue to occur after risk has been
reduced to an optimum level and reallocated in some principled fash-
ion. For present purposes I will concentrate on the two polar an-
swers, strict liability and strict non-liability, ignoring the compro-
mise of negligence. The former response can be found (or hinted at)
in cases concerning ultrahazardous activity and products liability,
the latter in doctrines that antedate the emergence of liability
insurance.45
The Expansion of Tort Liability for Personal Injury
Injuries may be compensated through either social insurance or
tort liability. The first might be dismissed as a lost cause. Move-
ments for comprehensive social insurance, though successful in New
Zealand, 46 have failed in the United Kingdom4 7 and Australia.48 In
compensate. See O'Connell, supra note 4, at 620-21.
44. See infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Ryan v. New York Cent. R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866) (defendant
might be liable for the first building it negligently set afire but not for any others
burned); H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928)
(defendant not liable for negligently failing to supply water to extinguish a fire).
46. T. BSON, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: A COMMENTARY ON THE NEW ZEALAND
SCHEME (1980); G. PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY OF LAW AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA (1979); Harris, Accident Compen-
sation in New Zealand: A Comprehensive Insurance System, 37 MOD. L. REv. 361
(1974); Palmer, Accident Compensation in New Zealand: The First Two Years, 25 AM.
J. CoMP. L. 1 (1977).
47. Ogus, Corfield & Harris, Pearson: Principled Reform or Political Compro-
mise?, 7 INDUS. L. J. 143 (1978).
48. See G. PALMER, supra note 46. The new Commonwealth Labour Government
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North America, social insurance has been limited to a few Canadian
provinces49 and never got off the ground in the United States.50 On
the other hand, there has been an extraordinary expansion of tort
liability, which might be turned to the advantage of victims of prop-
erty loss. The cumulative effect of recent American decisions has
gone far to make the liability insurer of the defendant (or the self-
insured defendant) a no-fault or loss insurer for personal injuries of
the victim. Categories of victims who previously would have been
barred have been allowed to recover. They include social guests and
trespassers injured by a negligent condition on the land of another,5 1
victims who are guilty of contributory fault 2 or who assumed the
risk53 or who have signed exculpatory clauses," a fetus in utero,55
and bystanders injured by a defective product.56 The standard of
care to which defendants are held has become more stringent due to
the extension of res ipsa loquitur,57 the application of negligence
standards to the exercise of professional judgment,58 and the expan-
plans to reintroduce a bill for social insurance.
49. Lang, The Nature and Potential of the Saskatchewan Insurance Experiment,
14 U. FLA. L. REV. 352 (1962).
50. See J. O'CONNELL, supra note 6; Widiss, Bovjerg & Cavers, supra note 8.
51. Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976);
Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 354 N.E.2d 794, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1976);
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
52. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975). Almost 40 American states have adopted comparative fault.
53. Gonzalez v. Garcia, 75 Cal. App. 3d 874, 142 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1977).
54. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr.
33 (1963); Henrioulle v. Main Ventures, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 512, 573 P.2d 465, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 247 (1978).
55. Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939). Some 25
states also allow wrongful death actions for a fetus negligently killed in utero. See Justus
v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 569 n.4, 565 P.2d 122, 125 n.4, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 n.4
(1977).
56. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1969).
57. Res ipsa loquitur was extended to multiple defendants in Ybarra v. Spangard,
25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) and Paul v. Paul, 41 A.D.2d 560, 339 N.Y.S.2d
901 (1973). The requirement that the plaintiff disprove his own fault was eliminated in
Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Gordon, 619 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1980). By analogy, courts have
eased the plaintiff's burden, of proving which of a number of negligent defendants was
causal. See Hall v. E.I. Du Point de Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Sindell, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Payton
v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982). This contributed to a $180
million settlement of the claims of thousands of Vietnam war veterans against the seven
manufacturers of the defoliant Agent Orange. L.A. Times, May 8, 1984, § I, at 1, col. 2.
58. Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (national standard applied
to board certified specialists); Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal.
sion of strict liability for ultrahazardous activity 59 and defective
products.6 0 The number of potentially liable defendants has in-
creased with the abolition of charitable and intrafamilial immunity,
the contraction of sovereign immunity, and the liberalization of the
concept of proximate cause.6 ' The doctrine of joint and several liabil-
ity allows the victim to recover in full from any solvent tortfeasor.
Compensable damages have proliferated to include recovery for emo-
tional distress incurred without physical impact 62 and without any
physical consequences. 63 Courts have awarded compensation for fear
for one's own safety or the safety of others,64 damage to an intimate
relationship (whether the loved one dies or survives impaired), 65 and
even wrongful life."6
Perhaps more relevant to the present topic is the increasingly ex-
plicit judicial invocation of insurance as the best solution to the prob-
lem of injury. A number of recent decisions have justified the impo-
sition of liability on the ground that the defendant is likely to be
insured. 67 One court even ordered an inquiry into the insurance cov-
Rptr. 225 (1969) (lawyer liable to potential beneficiary for negligent advice to testatrix).
59. See Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1973) (gasoline
trailer explosion).
60. Recent California decisions have reintroduced fault principles while shifting
to the defendants the burden to disprove negligence. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d
413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d
725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978) (reintroducing comparative fault of
plaintiff as a defense). They also have extended the regime to new fact situations. See,
e.g., Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972) (furnished
apartment).
61. For example, holding a remote (but solvent) tortfeasor responsible for the
conduct of a proximate (but insolvent) defendant. See Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting
Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 414 N.E.2d 666, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1980) (building site contrac-
tor liable for failure to protect worker against driver who suffered epileptic seizure).
Thus, the doctrine of joint and several liability allows the victim to recover in full from
any solvent tortfeasor. A broad construction of respondeat superior also achieves the
same end, see, e.g., Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 124 Cal. Rptr.
143 (1975) (employer liable for assault by employee).
62. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
63. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1980).
64. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
65. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 765 (1974) (spouses); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507,
413 N.E.2d 690 (1980) (spouse and child recover for paralysis of victim); Berger v.
Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981) (severely retarded and physically handi-
capped child recovers for injury to parent); Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225
N.W.2d 495 (1975) (parent recovers for injury disabling child); Green v. Bittner, 85
N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980) (parent recovers for death of child).
66. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982)
(parents recover for medical expenses and emotional distress of bearing and raising deaf
child who would not have been conceived but for defendant's negligence; child recovers
for additional medical costs after majority).
67. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d
436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) ("the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business"); Rowland v.
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erage of both parties before deciding whether to set off the injuries
of one against those of the other.6 8 Where insurance is present, it is
treated more like a status relationship (that is like social insurance)
than a creature of private contract law. In one case, a settlement was
reopened where the victim discovered injuries he could not have
known about at the time of the agreement.6 9 Insurance contracts
have been liberally construed to cover a victim's accident: one court
held that a stepson was not a "family member, '70 another that a
claim based on the negligent entrustment of a motorbike by a father
to his child did not pertain to the father's "ownership, maintenance,
operation [or] use" of the motorbike.7 1 A liability insurer was not
allowed to repudiate an insurance contract after an accident, on the
ground that the insured had made a material misrepresentation in
applying for the policy. 72 Courts have ruled that the insurer will be
denied any right of subrogation unless it is clearly specified in the
Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 111, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968) ("avail-
ability, cost, and prevalence of insurance" are factors to be considered); Petition of Kins-
man Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 725 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965)
("Where the line will be drawn will vary from age to age; as society has come to rely
increasingly on insurance and other methods of loss-sharing, the point may lie further off
than a century ago"); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 664, 143 N.E.2d 3, 7, 163
N.Y.S.2d 3, 9 (1957) ("the availability of insurance to protect against possible claims
and lawsuits"); Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169, 1173 n.4 (2d Cir. 1970)
("[tihe seeming severity of this doctrine is mitigated by the prevalence of liability insur-
ance which spreads the risks"). In Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 920, 479 P.2d 648,
652, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292 (1971) the court quoted W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 889 (3d ed. 1964), "[T]he suit is in reality aimed not at the defendant
family member but at his insurance carrier. In such case, the tort action poses no threat
whatever to family tranquility; in fact, 'domestic harmony will not be disrupted so much
by allowing the action as by denying it.'"
68. Jess v. Herrmann, 26 Cal. 3d 131, 604 P.2d 208, 161 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1979).
See also Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066, 1067 (Fla. 1982) (parental immunity to suit by
child waived only "to the extent of the parent's available liability insurance coverage").
Many judges, however, still refuse to allow the jury even to hear the word insurance
mentioned. See, e.g., Roman v. Mitchell, 82 N.J. 336, 413 A.2d 322 (1980) (trial judge
correctly prevented plaintiff's attorney from asking prospective jurors whether they held
stock in or were employed by insurance company).
69. Mangini v. McClurg, 24 N.Y.2d 556, 249 N.E.2d 386, 301 N.Y.S.2d 508
(1969).
70. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 30 Cal. 3d 800, 640 P.2d 764, 180 Cal. Rptr.
628 (1982) (holding that a stepson who lived with the insured and was treated as a
natural child was not a family member where a policy excluded damages for a bodily
injury to the insured or to any member of the family of the insured residing in the same
household as the insured).
71. Lalomia v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 35 A.D.2d 114, 312 N.Y.S.2d 1018
(1970), appeal dismissed, 27 N.Y.2d 796, 264 N.E.2d 349, 315 N.Y.S.2d 856, afi d, 31
N.Y.2d 830, 291 N.E.2d 724, 339 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1972).
72. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d 674, 79
Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969).
contract.7 3 Limited social insurance schemes like workers' compensa-
tion have been construed broadly to include the intentional killing of
one employee by another and the suicide of an employee following a
work-related injury.74 The refusal of an insurer to perform (to make
good the losses of an insured or those of a victim to whom the in-
sured is liable) has become one of the very few breaches of contract
for which tort damages will be awarded. 75 As a result, the liability
insurer may be held responsible for the full damages of the victim
even if these greatly exceed the policy limits.76
The Distributional Consequences of Tort Liability for Accidental
Property Loss
Even if it would be politically naive to contemplate a scheme of
comprehensive social insurance, there appears to be considerable mo-
mentum for expanding tort liability so that some insured, or self-
insured, defendant will bear the loss. Should we endorse and en-
courage this development where the damage is to property rather
than personal integrity? I believe we should not because tort liability
for property loss reinforces the unequal distribution of property and
the values that support and are supported by this distribution.
Tort damages for property loss have several distributional effects.
First, consider a two-car collision in which each driver is fifty per-
cent at fault and the jurisdiction follows comparative fault princi-
ples. A is driving a Rolls Royce worth $100,000 and enjoys a salary
of $200,000 a year. B is driving a wreck worth fifty dollars and lives
on a pension of $2000 a year. Both cars are demolished and both
drivers totally disabled. Each has compulsory liability insurance. As-
suming that their driving records are equivalent and no other factor
justifies attributing a greater risk potential to one than the other,
they will have paid the same liability insurance premiums. This
means, however, that B will be paying a premium much higher than
would be necessary to protect the property and income he enjoys
while A will be paying a premium much lower than would be neces-
sary to protect the property and income he enjoys. Compulsory lia-
bility insurance makes sense when it protects personal integrity (be-
cause people are equally vulnerable). When protecting property,
73. Frost v. Porter Leasing Corp., 386 Mass. 425, 436 N.E.2d 387 (1982).
74. Seymour v. Rivera Appliances Corp., 28 N.Y.2d 406, 271 N.E.2d 224, 322
N.Y.S.2d 243 (1971); Reinstein v. Mendola, 33 N.Y.2d 589, 301 N.E.2d 438, 347
N.Y.S.2d 455 (1973).
75. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1967).
76. See, e.g., Samson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 3d 220, 636 P.2d 32, 178
Cal. Rptr. 343 (1981).
77. Damages for property loss distort liability for personal integrity as well. Be-
cause of the impossibility of assigning a money value to intangible injuries, lawyers and
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however, it functions as a form of regressive quasi-public taxation to
generate the reserves necessary to preserve the existing, unequal dis-
tribution of property (both wealth and income).
The same point can be made by analyzing the well-known case of
H.R. Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co.78 In Moch, the defendant water
company was charged with negligent failure to provide water pres-
sure sufficient to allow a fire department to extinguish a fire that
consumed the property of the plaintiff. Judge Cardozo denied liabil-
ity on two grounds: the plaintiff was not an intended third-party ben-
eficiary of the defendant's contract to provide the city with water;
and the defendant was guilty of nonfeasance, not misfeasance. Had
liability been imposed, the property damage caused by (some) fires
would have become the cost of water (since the water company held
a natural monopoly). Consequently, liability would have been borne
in proportion to the water consumed (most heavily by farmers, for
instance, or the municipal swimming pool, or paper manufacturers)
rather than in proportion to the risk of property loss (in which case it
might fall most heavily on the owners of large estates or of paint
warehouses) .7 Let me adapt the facts of Moch slightly to my own
environment-Los Angeles. Let us suppose the following situation:
(1) the fire department is liable for negligent failure to extinguish
fires (this is not California law); (2) fires are less common and less
destructive on the flatlands where more people live than on the hills
populated by movie moguls and entertainment stars (this certainly is
true of brushfires in the hot, dry fall); and (3) the fire department
obtains its revenues (from which it discharges its liabilities) through
an ad valorem property tax (this is at least partly the case). As a
result, the masses who suffer the smog, crime, and congestion of ur-
ban Los Angeles will be paying part of the cost of protecting and
compensating the few who enjoy the clear air and ocean views of the
hills.80
courts often use a crude rule of thumb that "generals" (intangible injury or pain and
suffering) are between one and two times "specials" (medical expenses and lost earn-
ings). Thus B's liability insurance premium also is inflated in order to compensate A's
pain at a higher level than B's own pain will be valued.
78. 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
79. This, of course, is what Calabresi calls the problem of "what is a cost of
what?" G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Part IfI (1970). Calabresi engages in an economic analysis by asking who is the cheapest
primary accident cost avoider. I am more concerned with the distributional issue of who
should be made richer or poorer, which is inescapably a political question.
80. An example of the distributional consequences is a one billion dollar claim
made against Los Angeles County by some 200 property owners in Malibu alleging that
An analogous situation can arise with respect to services offered
by the private sector. Suppose a lawyer drafts two wills, virtually
identical in form and taking the same amount of time and effort; one
for C, who is worth $1000, and the other for D, who is worth one
million dollars. Because the lawyer (correctly) fears he may be held
liable to potential heirs if his negligence invalidates the will or causes
undesirable tax consequences, he takes out malpractice insurance.8'
If the lawyer charges C and D comparable fees for comparable work
and incorporates an equivalent proportion of his malpractice insur-
ance premium in each bill, C will be paying to protect D's heirs, who
stand to gain or lose a benefit vastly greater than that of C's own
heirs.8 2 Or take another example that lies beyond the frontiers of
present tort law but in which liability could be imposed through a
straightforward extension of decided cases. A- newspaper columnist
negligently offers erroneous financial advice in a weekly column.
Two readers invest in reliance on this advice, E losing $1000 and F
losing $100,000. Liability for the loss (paid from self-insurance
reserves or by a liability insurance policy, which results in higher
premiums) will cause an increase in the price of the paper borne
equally by investors E and F as well as by non-investor readers, to-
gether with an increase in advertising rates, ultimately borne by the
consumers of advertised products. 83
a hillside belonging to the county slid, thus damaging or endangering their land. The
property owners sought compensation for both property damage and emotional distress.
Individual claims ranged from $3-500 million. L.A. Times, Dec. 22, 1983, § 4, at 1, col.
3.
81. See supra note 58.
82. One objection to this argument is that the market will compel lawyers to allo-
cate insurance premium costs to each transaction in proportion to the risks generated
because otherwise competitors will undercut the price of low-risk transactions. This
seems implausible for several reasons. First, it is difficult if not impossible for a lawyer to
know how much risk any given transaction generates. Second, the apportioned risk pre-
mium almost certainly is too small in comparison with the total legal fee significantly to
affect the overall price of the services. Third, most testators are not repeat players.
Fourth, and most important, lawyers do not engage in meaningful price competition.
Even after Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), price competition continues
to be discouraged by the legal profession. As a result, little competition actually occurs,
and there are enormous disparities in fees for equivalent services within the same local-
ity. Furthermore, lawyers generally do not inform their clients what the fee will be until
after the transaction is completed. For a look at compliance with the Bates decision by
state bar associations and supreme courts, see Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and the
First Amendment, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 967. On lawyer behavior and the
extent of price competition, see S. Cox, W. CANBY,& A. DESERPA, LEGAL SERVICE
PRICING AND ADVERTISING (1978); S. Cox, THE PRICE EFFECTS OF ATTORNEY ADVER-
TISING REGULATIONS (1982-83); Cox, Canby & DeSerpa, Consumer Information and
the Pricing of Legal Services, 30 J. IND. ECON. 305 (1982).
To offer an illustration from another profession, the fee dentists charge for coating the
surface of a tooth with plastic sealant varies from $4 to $100 a tooth. L.A. Times, Dec.
8, 1983, § I, at 5, col. 3.
83. A California court of appeal recently held an estate agent liable to a pur-
chaser for the loss of value of a house caused by land slippage that the agent reasonably
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The tendency of tort law to translate inequalities of property into
inequalities of power in other spheres can be illustrated by two dis-
parate examples involving the law of nuisance and damages for lost
earnings following personal injury. When owners of adjacent parcels
seek to put them to incompatible uses the landowner whose use is
more "productive" (that is, capable of producing a higher rate of
profit) can compel his neighbor to surrender an incompatible use (al-
though the former may have to pay compensation if use by the latter
was prior in time).84 Thus a question of competing values is trans-
ferred from the realm of politics, where democratic theory accords
each party an equal voice, to that of economics, where unequal prop-
erty entitlements can determine outcomes. The fact that damages for
personal injury are a function of income has a similar effect: it
makes the safety of those who enjoy high incomes more valuable
than the safety of those who earn low wages and, a fortiori, of those
without any earned income or prospect of it. When cost-benefit anal-
ysis adopts a similar concept of human worth, the resulting regula-
tory decisions often reproduce inequalities of income in allocating
safety.85
The Symbolic Message of Damages for Property Loss
At the same time that tort law affects the allocation of resources
(safety in confronting risk, compensation following injury), it also
reinforces the system of symbols and values by which this allocation
is justified. Tort damages for property loss affirm the justice of the
existing distribution of property. The award of damages signifies that
property interests are as important as physical and emotional integ-
should have discovered. See Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 104-05, 199
Cal. Rptr. 383, 391 (1984).
84. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970); Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494
P.2d 700 (1972); Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). In balancing compet-
ing interests, the market weighs only those that have been or can be commodified. In
politics, by contrast, other values may be given weight. It is the crudest kind of economic
reductionism to assume that, because our society uses the market for some purposes, it
does or should use it for all. See G. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUIMsAN
BEHAVIOR (1976); R. BRENNER, HISTORY-THE HUMAN GAMBLE (1983).
85. For the measure of "discounted future earnings," see Rhoads, How Much
Should We Spend To Save A Life?, 51 PUB. INTEREST 74 (1978); see also Noble, Cost
Benefit Analysis: The Regulation of Business or Scientific Pornography, 11(6) HEALTH
POLICY ADVISORY CENTER BULLETIN 1 (July/August 1980); Zeckhauser & Leonard,
Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Risks: Its Philosophy and Legitimacy, in VALUES AT
RISK (D. MacLean ed. 1985).
rity and (by extension) that property can and should be loved in the
same way we love other people. Indeed, to the extent that property
losses are more easily quantified than so-called "intangible" injuries
and thus more readily translated into money (the only remedy our
legal system offers), tort damages declare that values expressed in
market terms are superior to those that cannot be. Tort damages for
property loss declare that the importance of a victim or potential
victim depends on how much the victim owns and earns, now and in
the future. Tort law makes it appropriate, indeed inevitable, that ine-
qualities of property will be translated into the political sphere,
where they will influence decisions about property use, safety regula-
tions, and the allocation of public services.
Proponents of tort damages for accidental property loss might ar-
gue that even if such damages contribute to the existing distribution
of property and reinforce its legitimacy, the contribution is minor. If
we were to withdraw the protection of tort law (as I propose at the
end of this Article), the distribution of property would not change
significantly. Those who enjoy property could protect their privileges
through contract (including insurance contracts), although they
would have to incur the cost. Property owners still would be able to
exert disproportionate influence over the political process and the al-
location of public services. The distribution of wealth and power
would continue to draw symbolic support from other bodies of sub-
stantive law (such as contract and property). Furthermore, it is both
arbitrary and inefficient to redistribute wealth and power through
the chance occurrence of accidental loss.
Each of these arguments assumes that the burden of persuasion is
on those, like myself, who advocate change. On the contrary, I be-
lieve it is the apologists for the present system who must justify it.
The imposition of tort liability for accidental injury to property rep-
resents an exercise of state power, both coercive and symbolic. It
signifies that the victim is entitled to the lost property and that the
defendant is responsible for restoring it because he has committed a
wrong. Property is taken away from the defendant and given to the
victim. Unless strong arguments can be presented for using state co-
ercion or for allying the state with this particular set of values, tort
damages for accidental property loss lack legitimacy. It would be
false naivete, if not hypocrisy, to criticize my proposal for doing too
little to redistribute property unless the critic can propose another
strategy that will be more effective and has a greater chance of
implementation. 6
86. One merit of my proposal is avoidance of certain obvious political obstacles.
First, it calls for the withdrawal, not the expansion, of state power. Second, it addresses
the judiciary, which is somewhat disposed to hear principled arguments, rather than the
legislature, which is far more responsive to pressure groups, especially those that wield
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"THE SAFETY OF THE PERSON IS MORE SACRED THAN THE
SAFETY OF PROPERTY
' 8 7
In the preceding section, in order to heighten the tension between
our present legal regime and my misgivings about the distribution
and centrality of private property in our society (an uneasiness I be-
lieve is widely shared), I portrayed tort law as though it extends its
protection to property enthusiastically and without reservations. In
fact, the law displays considerable ambivalence toward property loss.
In many diverse areas tort law withholds from property the degree of
protection it grants to personal integrity. When defendant liability is
predicated on the manufacture or sale of a defective product, a vic-
tim who suffers only economic loss may not be able to recover in
tort, particularly if there is no risk of physical injury. In comparison,
a victim who suffers or is threatened with physical injury may be
able to recover economic loss as well. 88 Courts that compensate for
physical damage to property are unwilling to allow the owner of a
capital good to recover for anticipated profits lost during the period
it was rendered inoperable.8 9
Courts have been more cautious in finding that an economic loss
was foreseeable than in making that finding about a physical in-
jury.90 The worker who suffers physical injury and lost income can
recover for both, but employers cannot recover lost profits as a re-
sult.91 A spouse, parent, or child who experiences emotional distress
because the other spouse, child, or parent is injured or killed can
recover in tort.92 There is no equivalent protection for negligent
damage to a partner in a commercial relationship, even if the other
partner suffers equivalent emotional distress.
In recent years, courts have emphasized that they are recognizing
and protecting personal relationships, not purely pecuniary interests.
Although the death of a child may confer a net economic benefit on
economic power.
87. Sullivan v. Dunham, 161 N.Y. 290, 294, 55 N.E. 923, 924 (1900).
88. Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587, 594 n.5, 575 P.2d 1383, 1386 n.5
(1978). The court said, in dictum, that a threat of physical injury to other property also
would trigger liability for consequential economic damages.
89. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. v. FMC Corp., 53 A.D.2d 150, 385 N.Y.S.2d
971 (1976); Turner v. Reynolds, 271 A.D. 413, 66 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1946), appeal denied,
296 N.Y. 1062, 71 N.E.2d 778 (1947).
90. See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968); Ryan
v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
91. See, e.g., Phoenix Professional Hockey Club, Inc. v. Hirmer, 108 Ariz. 482,
502 P.2d 164 (1972).
92. See cases cited supra note 65.
the family, parents still can recover for loss of society, companion-
ship, and affection. 3 A victim can recover damages for fear of injury
to self9 4 or for emotional distress caused by witnessing an injury to a
loved one,95 but not for fear of injury to property or for witnessing
the destruction of property, 96 even a possession so invested with emo-
tion as a household pet.9 7 The sole exception to this rule reaffirms the
underlying principle: a bereaved person can recover for injury to the
corpse of the deceased, not because property has been damaged
(there is no property interest in a corpse) but because the injury ag-
gravates the rupture of the interpersonal relationship.98
A psychiatrist has a duty to warn a potential victim who is physi-
cally threatened by a patient the psychiatrist has treated99 but not
those threatened only with loss of property. 100 The state assumes that
the value of self-preservation is so strong and so widely held that it
criminalizes suicide and devotes substantial resources to restraining
and caring for potential suicides.10 It holds custodians (such as
93. Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980); Ahrenholz v. Hennepin
County, 295 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. 1980) ($100,000 award for death of month-old child to
compensate parents for loss of potential guidance in their old age). It costs a middle-class
family more than $300,000 to raise a child from conception to financial independence.
For an historical analysis of the transformation of the child from an economic to an
emotional asset, see V. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD (1986).
94. See Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1961).
95. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
96. Van Patten v. Buyce, 37 A.D.2d 448, 326 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1971) (plaintiff was
awakened when truck crashed into her house; she saw all her china and crystal wedding
gifts destroyed). But see Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970) (emo-
tional distress damages awarded when owners built their home themselves), and Hunsley
v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976) (car crashes into house damaging it
and contents, threatening plaintiff's husband, and causing plaintiff to injure self).
97. Roman v. Carroll, 127 Ariz. 398, 621 P.2d 307 (1980) (owner watched poo-
dle being dismembered by St. Bernard); Di Michele v. Filacchione, 60 Misc. 2d 619, 303
N.Y.S.2d 562 (1969) (death of favorite horse). But see Campbell v. Animal Quarantine
Station, 63 Hawaii 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (1981) (nine-year-old-boxer, raised by family
since puppy, died of heat prostration, and family learned by telephone; $200 awarded to
each of five or six family members).
98. See, e.g., Corrigal v. Bail & Dodd Funeral Home, Inc., 89 Wash. 2d 959, 577
P.2d 580 (1978) (son's cremated remains placed in plastic sack through which mother
rummaged, looking for non-existent burial urn). The notion that personal injury can be
suffered through an affront to the body of a deceased relative is as old as classical
Greece, as illustrated in Sophocles's Antigone. That the law is concerned with emotional
distress is clear from the cases allowing recovery for negligently misinforming next-of-kin
of a death. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d
638 (1975).
99. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
100. Bellah v. Greenson, 81 Cal. App. 3d 614, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1978) (no
liability even though plaintiffs' daughter threatened and ultimately committed suicide).
Note, however, that a landowner must act affirmatively to prevent damage to a neigh-
bor's property even if the threat is created by a natural condition on the owner's land.
Sprecher v. Adamson Co., 30 Cal. 3d 358, 636 P.2d 1121, 178 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1981).
101. In the fall of 1983 the State of California was involved in the trial of a cere-
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prison wardens and even hotelkeepers) responsible for exercising rea-
sonable care to prevent suicide. 10 2 The state makes doctors liable for
failing to report child abuse.10 3 It also assumes that an unconscious
patient would consent to the emergency treatment necessary to save
his or her life.104 The state overrides the refusal of parents to consent
to the treatment of a child whose life is imperilled, even when their
refusal is based on religious grounds. 10 5
We outlaw such extreme invasions of personal integrity as prosti-
tution, sadomasochism, and slavery (even if we continue to tolerate
them). But there are no comparable restraints on the right of an
owner to destroy property.106 A parent who withholds nourishment
or nurturance or otherwise endangers a child will be deprived of cus-
tody and eventually of parental rights; but a parent freely can waste
or destroy an estate or disinherit a child. The respect we feel for
personal integrity is evident in the constitutional limitations on state
actions that threaten such fundamental expressions of autonomy as
freedom of speech and religion, political association, and privacy. By
contrast, the state has broad discretion to act in the name of eco-
nomic regulation, although it may have to compensate property
owners.10 7
Tort law continues to expand its protection of personal integrity
while declining to treat property interests in the same manner. Thus
the "thin-skull" rule protects a victim against any physical or emo-
tional injury, no matter how idiosyncratic the victim's reaction. 08
bral palsy victim who insisted on her right to commit suicide, by starvation if necessary,
despite the efforts of her hospital to force-feed her. See Hughes, L.A. Times, Dec. 8,
1983, § I, at 3, col. 5. The court ultimately denied her request for permission to starve
herself, though it also denied the hospital's motion for an order approving force-feeding.
Hughes, L.A. Times, Dec. 21, 1983, § I, at 3, col. 3. It subsequently ordered her not to
resist force-feeding. L.A. Times, Dec. 23, 1983, § I, at 3, col 2. In April 1984 she de-
cided that she wished to live and began eating again.
102. See, e.g., Dezort v. Village of Hinsdale, 35 Ill. App. 3d 703, 342 N.E.2d 468
(1976) (jail); Sneider v. Hyatt Corp., 390 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (hotel).
103. Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
104. See Wheeler v. Barker, 92 Cal. App. 2d 776, 208 P.2d 68 (1949); Preston v.
Hubbel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 53, 196 P.2d 113 (1948).
105. In re Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978); In re
Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979).
106. This is less true today, not because we are paternalistic toward the property
owner but because we are beginning to socialize private property, recognizing that others
have an interest in historical landmarks, works of art, environmental amenities, etc.
107. The increasing scope of constitutional protection for commercial speech runs
counter to this distinction. For a critique, see Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW 253 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
108. See, e.g., Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970)
(schizophrenia).
But tort law appears to require that the specific property damage be
reasonably foreseeable by the tortfeasor before imposing liability. 109
A tortfeasor who causes physical injury is responsible for its aggra-
vation by a third party, even if the third party is negligent or com-
mits medical malpractice. But a tortfeasor who inflicts mere property
damage is not responsible when the condition deteriorates further
during an attempted repair, even if the repairer is not negligent. 110 A
tortfeasor who exposes one person to physical risk is liable to another
who is injured in attempting a rescue,"' but I do not know, nor can I
imagine, a case where the rescuer of property is compensated for
physical injury. Similarly a tortfeasor who causes physical injury
may be liable if the victim commits suicide," 2 but I do not think any
court would hold that a tortfeasor who damages property should rea-
sonably foresee that the property owner might commit suicide.
Other bodies of law also express greater concern for personal in-
tegrity than for property rights. The interaction between tort and
contract is instructive in this regard. Breach of contract typically in-
curs contract damages, not tort; an exception is made only when the
contract protects personal integrity. Thus the failure of a medical
procedure (like plastic surgery) to produce the promised results justi-
fies not only restitution of the consideration paid but also compensa-
tion for the emotional distress suffered, though not for the economic
gain anticipated had the operation been successful."' Willful breach
of a contract of insurance (both loss and liability) renders the insurer
liable to the insured for emotional distress because the purpose of the
contract is to protect against the risk of personal injury." 4 A similar
distinction can be seen in the capacity of contract to narrow tort
recovery rather than expand it. For instance, an exculpatory clause
or disclaimer is effective when the injury is to property but not when
it is to physical integrity, when the victim is a commercial entity but
not when it is the ultimate consumer.""' The law of intentional torts
109. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., Ltd. (The Wagon
Mound), 1961 A.C. 388.
110. Exner Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Petterson Lighterage & Towing Corp., 258
F.2d I (2d Cir. 1958).
11. Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
112. See, e.g., Fuller v. Preis, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1974); Grant v.
F.P. Lathrop Constr. Co., 81 Cal. App. 3d 790, 146 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1978); Exxon Corp.
v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 526 S.W.2d 519
(Tex. 1975).
113. Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973).
114. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text; Danaher v. Partridge Creek
Country Club, 116 Mich. App. 305, 323 N.W.2d 376 (1982); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
115. Compare Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (seller cannot limit liability for defective car repair and replace-
ment), with Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal.
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and criminal law both make analogous distinctions. The unlawful
touching of property is not an assault, though any nonconsensual
touching of the person is. An individual is entitled to use deadly
force to protect his personal integrity and that of his loved ones but
not to defend the inviolability of his property. The criminal law typi-
cally penalizes invasions of personal integrity more severely than
property crimes, and public opinion supports this ranking.
Finally, it is significant that the fragmentary forms of social insur-
ance various countries have enacted exclude or limit protection for
property. Thus broad no-fault schemes like that of New Zealand11 6
or the workers' compensation systems in many jurisdictions1 7 deal
with injury to the person but provide only limited compensation for
lost wages and none for property damage. The partial no-fault auto-
mobile accident schemes enacted by many American states1 , allow
recourse to tort liability for the victim of a serious personal injury
but not for someone who has suffered unusual property damage. The
state offers relief to those who experience losses in natural disasters
but not to those who invest in a fraudulent scam. State compensation
plans respond to the victims of violent crime but not to those who
have suffered only property loss. 1 9 All western nations (except the
United States) accepted responsibility for health services long before
accepting similar responsibility for legal services, and the former are
still much more comprehensive and generous than the latter. These
allocational decisions are indicative of the priority of health over
wealth. The evolution of legal services also illustrates this principle:
they are provided for threats to personal integrity (that is criminal
charges leading to incarceration)1 20 but remain unavailable where
Rptr. 518 (1965) (seller effectively disclaimed liability for property damage). Legislation
does limit the power of manufacturers and sellers to waive or circumscribe warranties
intended to protect the consumer against failure of performance, but these laws rarely
are enforced. See Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 115 (1979).
116. See sources discussing the New Zealand system cited supra note 46.
117. See generally A. LARSON. THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1952).
118. See generally Widiss, Boujerg & Cavers, supra note 8.
119. See, e.g., H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIs, PUBLIC COMPENSATION TO VICTIMS OF
CRIME (1974); Hodgin, The Criminal Injuries Compensation Board: The First Ten
Years (1964-1974), 6 ANGLo-AM. L. REV. 34 (1977).
120. This was the justification for extending constitutional protection to the right
to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972). For an account of the extension of legal aid in the United Kingdom and
the United States along this dimension, see Abel, Toward a Political Economy of Law-
yers, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 1117, 1168.
the client stands to gain some economic advantage. 121
STATE ACTION PROTECTING PROPERTY AGAINST ACCIDENTAL
Loss Is UNPRINCIPLED
In the previous section I argued that the law displays ambivalence
in protecting property against accidental damage while showing
greater concern for personal integrity. Now I want to demonstrate
that the way in which the state protects property is fundamentally
and irretrievably flawed. First I will look at state action in the
broadest sense; in the next section I will examine the tort regime
itself.
The decision to protect property necessarily begins with the defini-
tion of what is property and thus worthy of protection. But the con-
tent of the concept cannot be derived solely from legal norms.122 It
represents a political choice, even when this choice is made by an
institution, such as a court, that purports to apply the law. We can
see this most clearly in nuisance law. The decision to protect one of
two incompatible adjacent land uses is inherently political: should a
court favor fishermen or offshore oil exploitation, for instance? 23
The question cannot be answered by asserting that one party has a
property right (or even that the party gave "value" for the entitle-
ment) because that is precisely what must be decided. Nor is it suffi-
cient to refer to priority in time because that, too, reflects a choice of
values. How serious the invasion must be to justify state action also
is a political decision (a ten percent reduction in the catch? fifty
percent?). And the selection of a remedy, whether damages, an in-
junction, or criminal penalties, cannot be resolved by reference to the
efficient allocation of resources1 2 4 because what counts as a cost or
benefit and how to value those for which no market exists are politi-
cal decisions as well.
The problem with nuisance law is that legal institutions are re-
quired to make political decisions for which they can offer no legal
justification. Even when political institutions are given responsibility,
they often do not explain why some property interests are protected
against accidental loss and others are not. The political branches of
government-legislative and executive--constantly take actions that
121. The personal injury plaintiff can obtain legal aid in the United Kingdom but
not in the United States, where the contingent fee system purportedly makes counsel
available; legal aid is not granted for property or business matters in either country.
122. F. PARKIN, MARXISM AND CLASS THEORY: A BOURGEOIS CRITIQUE 50
(1979). For an historical account of changes in the concept of the property interest in
contract, and thus in its protection from the tort of intentional interference, see Note,
Tortious Interference With Contracted Relations In The Nineteenth Century: The
Transformation of Property, Contract and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1980).
123. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
124. As suggested by Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 84.
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profoundly affect property interests, enriching some people and im-
poverishing others. Yet there are few controls on such action and
little or no attempt to offer principled justifications. Examples of this
include government decisions to award or deny, renew or cancel a
contract; to extend or withdraw price controls or supports; to build
or close, improve or neglect some essential part of the infrastructure
such as a bridge or tunnel, public housing project or prison, army
base, road, 125 transit system, or school; or to rescue or abandon a
financially troubled industry.126 All of these decisions typically are
exempt from judicial review precisely because there are no criteria
by which courts can evaluate them. Nor is government any more
accountable in its role as benefactor. Courts will not review the fail-
ure of state schools to educate,127 and they offer scant protection to
the recipients of welfare, social security, disability, unemployment or
veteran's benefits. 28 It is instructive to contrast the lack of protec-
tion for those whose very survival depends on government benefits
with the extensive procedural protections enjoyed by high status ben-
eficiaries of state largesse-such as radio and television stations,
common carriers, and the professions, all of which owe their monop-
olies to government fiat.129 These differences parallel those between
125. The completion of 12 miles of freeway, which will bypass a stretch of U.S.
101 near San Jose, California, a road filled with fruit stands and other stores catering to
the tourist trade, will wipe out a dozen small businesses, some of which date back to the
1930's. Farhi, L.A. Times, Nov. 28, 1983, § V, at 1, col. 1.
126. On the difficulty of offering a justification for the 1971 Lockheed loan guar-
antee, see Turkel, Rational Law and Boundary Maintenance: Legitimating the 1971
Lockheed Loan Guarantee, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 41 (1980-81). For a proposal to han-
dle both the enrichment and the impoverishment of landowners as a consequence of gov-
ernment action, see WINDFALLS FOR WiPEouTs: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSA-
TION (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978). Consider, for instance, the decision to
locate one of the stops of the proposed Metro Rail underground system in Los Angeles at
the site of a large department store, May Co., and to connect four of the six entrances at
that stop directly to the store. Clifford, L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 1984, § IX, at 3, col. 1.
127. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d
814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47
N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
128. Richard de Friend has argued that legal "rights" cannot protect welfare ben-
efits. de Friend, Welfare Law, Legal Theory and Legal Education, in WELFARE LAW
AND POLICY 43 (M. Partington & J. Jowell eds. 1979). Although the recipient of state
benefits enjoys certain procedural rights (e.g., to a hearing before benefits are changed)
and can insist that administrators adhere to both statutes and the constitution, there is
nothing to prevent the legislature from reducing or terminating benefits at will-even
"vested" benefits such as social security-and certainly nothing to compel the govern-
ment to adjust them for inflation.
129. 1 am thinking, for instance, of the extreme rarity with which a lawyer is dis-
barred or a physician loses his license and the fact that the professional who is being
disciplined enjoys elaborate safeguards including appeal to the highest court. For an ac-
the inadequate protection and insufficient compensation provided by
the state to the urban poor and ethnic minorities, both of whom are
the principal victims of crime,130 and the extraordinary resources the
United States government expends in protecting American busi-
nesses abroad against expropriation and in compensating them for
assets seized.
Sometimes the law discriminates among protected property inter-
ests in ways that explicitly recognize major social cleavages. When a
capital good (a machine, for instance) is damaged physically, the
factory owner will be compensated for both the loss of value and the
profits that would have been earned during the period when the in-
vestment was unproductive, as long as the owner demonstrates that
these profits cannot be recouped later.13 Workers, however, cannot
claim any compensation for their losses during the period the factory
was shut down. Since they do not own the means of production, they
have no claim to the lost profits. Workers can only sell their labor;
but since no labor was expended during this period, they are not
entitled to wages. After all, the capitalist could curtail production,
lay off employees, or even close the plant, and the workers would
have no redress. Neither would suppliers, local businesses, their em-
ployees, or other residents-all of whom might be affected pro-
foundly. These individuals and entities have no right to participate in
decisions about continuing production or even to be heard. Further-
more, none has a right to compensation if production ceases-even
those who have "invested" in the factory through governmental con-
struction of essential infrastructure, loans, rezoning, regulatory re-
lief, or tax rebates-all of which are financed by their taxes. Once
again it is instructive to contrast the precariousness of the "prop-
erty" interests of workers (and others who provide labor, raw materi-
als, component parts, and infrastructure, or contribute to the repro-
duction of labor) when capital decides to flee 32 with the protection
count of the bias of British judges who review administrative decisions concerning tax
planning and licensing authorities more stringently than those concerning welfare recipi-
ents, see J.A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY 107 (1977).
130. Cohen, Klugel, & Land, Social Inequality and Predatory Criminal Victimi-
zation: An Exposition and Test of a Formal Theory, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 505 (1981). This
insecurity can extend to minority businesses as well as to personal integrity. The family
of a black businessman, who owns and operates a grocery store in Watts (a black ghetto
in Los Angeles), has been terrorized by a local gang ever since the son shot one of the
gang members while resisting robbery. See Stewart, L.A. Times, Dec. 10, 1983, § II, at
I, col. 2. More recently, the mortuary business of the family has been destroyed by fire,
suspected to be arson. L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 1984, § II, at 1, col. 5.
131. See cases cited supra note 89.
132. As a nineteenth-century political economist wrote of capital: "[ilts workings
must be free as air, for at sight of human ties, it will spread the light wings of capital
and fly away from bondage." A. URE, PHILOSOPHY OF MANUFACTURES 453 (1835),
quoted in Carson, The Other Price of Britain's Oil: Regulating Safety On Offshore Oil
Installations In The British Sector Of The North Sea, 4 CONTEMP. CRISES 239, 247
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offered to capital invested overseas when those same workers and
other residents seek to gain control over the means of production.
Thus capitalist tort law does not protect some abstract apolitical
concept of property but rather a historically specific form, namely
capitalist property. We can see this more clearly by examining two
instances where the law has discarded feudal residues. Under feudal-
ism a master could sue for interference with his right to his servant's
labor,13 3 just as the state could punish criminally a servant who left a
position without the consent of his master.. 4 Capitalism, however,
demands the greatest possible mobility of labor (as of capital).' 3
Therefore, a master no longer can-maintain an action for negligent
injury to a servant,136 nor can he enforce an employment contract by
specific performance. And it no longer is a crime to break a contract
of employment. (A parallel can be drawn with the contemporary at-
tack on patriarchy and the gradual disappearance of the cause of
action for alienation of affections, as well as its converse, breach of
promise of marriage.) 137 Tort law also appears uncomfortable with
another relic of feudalism. A decision at the beginning of this cen-
tury refused to recognize that tenants and bailees might have a prop-
erty interest in realty or personalty meriting protection against negli-
gent interference in situations where those with a freehold interest
(the counterpart of the feudal lord) could recover.'38 But this distinc-
tion has been criticized, 39 and I would expect it to be repudiated as
judges acknowledge that a capital good may just as appropriately be
leased as owned outright.
TORT RULES PROTECTING PROPERTY AGAINST ACCIDENTAL Loss
ARE AMBIGUOUS AND ARBITRARY
In the previous section I advanced four arguments: (1) legislative
and executive decisions have affected property interests far more per-
(1980).
133. See supra note 122.
134. R. SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 84-87 (1978).
135. See K. POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECO-
NOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (1957).
136. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
137. Tribal societies still grant a husband an action for adultery and a father an
action for the seduction or impregnation of an unmarried daughter.
138. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
139. Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. M/V Marathonian, 528 F.2d 907
(2d Cir. 1975) (reluctantly following Robins), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 (1976); James,
Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Ap-
praisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43 (1972).
vasively and profoundly than do the private acts that tort law claims
to regulate; (2) the state necessarily operates in an unprincipled
manner, reflecting political and economic power; (3) state action is
more restrained when it impinges on the "new property" of the rich
and powerful than when it violates that of the poor and powerless;
and (4) capitalist tort law protects only capitalist property.
It is no revelation that political institutions mirror the distribution
of power. Legal institutions, however, purport to administer equal
justice, respect neutral principles, and follow rules expressing values
that command a broad consensus. The ultimate justification for
granting coercive power to the undemocratic authority of a court is
that the judge obeys clear rules furthering some agreed social pur-
pose. Does tort law satisfy these criteria? Do the decisions about who
recovers for accidental property loss under what circumstances fol-
low a coherent body of rules? Furthermore, do those rules articulate
accepted social values? I think the answer clearly is no. We cannot
offer a persuasive account for why one victim recovers and another
does not by reference to either rules or values. Decisions therefore
must be, and must appear to be, arbitrary and hence unjust, because
the arbitrary exercise of power is the essence of injustice.
One way of framing the first problem-the indeterminacy of these
rules-is to note that the criteria advanced to guide judicial decision-
making vary continuously, but the decision itself-liability/nonlia-
bility-is dichotomous. No reason is given for choosing any particu-
lar point along the continuum and none could be given.' 40 I can
illustrate this difficulty by means of examples drawn from another
area of tort law where the logic of the problem is identical. Ameri-
can (as well as English) tort law long has awarded damages for pain
and suffering. But the pain inflicted by physical injury and property
loss ramifies endlessly. Courts therefore must explain why they com-
pensate victims for some pain but not for all. They began by award-
ing damages for emotional distress only if the victim was touched.14,
Then they extended liability to situations where the victim was
threatened physically, 142 where a close relative was injured in the
presence of the victim and the victim suffered physical consequences
as a result of the emotional distress, 43 and ultimately where there
was emotional distress but no physical injury. 44 Each of these rul-
140. Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory: Three Essays in Adjudication and Polit-
ics, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 383 (1979).
141. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
142. Battalla v. State of New York, 190 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219
N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
143. Compare Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968), with Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1969).
144. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal.
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ings, proclaimed as principled and necessary at the time, was repudi-
ated by the later cases. The present boundaries are no less contin-
gent and arbitrary and therefore are subject to distortion depending
upon the facts of a particular case. For example, why should a par-
ent recover if present when a child is injured but not if the parent
arrives moments later,145 or if the child deteriorates rapidly but not
if the decline is more gradual? 4" Why allow recovery if the parent
independently perceives the threat but not if the vital signs have to
be interpreted by a physician? 41 Furthermore, if a parent recovers,
why not allow other relatives or close friends to do sO?148 Why allow
one spouse to recover loss of consortium when the other is injured
but disallow parents and children to recover when their relationship
is disrupted by a similar injury? 49 Each time a court refuses to take
the next step, a strong dissent notes that every argument marshalled
by the majority has been considered and rejected in the earlier
cases. 150 This problem-the impossibility of rationalizing any bound-
ary-has surfaced most recently in the so-called "wrongful life"
cases. In these cases, the parents of a child (unwanted because the
parents had chosen to limit their family, or the child had a severe
genetic defect, or the mother was unmarried), and sometimes the
child as well, seek damages for medical and other expenses and also
for emotional suffering. 15 ' Courts often invoke the standard of "fore-
Rptr. 831 (1980).
145. Compare Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 290, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723(1969), with Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977).
146. See, e.g., Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106
Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973). But see Nazaroff v. Superior Ct., 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 657 (1978) (child lingered for several days after a drowning that parent did not
witness).
147. Compare Mobaldi v. Board of Regents, 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr.
720 (1976), with Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1977).
148. In Mobaldi, a foster parent was allowed to recover even though her applica-
tion to adopt the child had been denied.
149. Compare Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669,
115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974), with Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563
P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977), and Baxter v. Superior Ct., 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563
P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977).
150. "The majority opinion effectively demolishes every legalism and every policy
argument which would deny recovery ... yet, having shown all this, inexplicably, recov-
ery is denied." Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 619, 249 N.E.2d at 424-25 (Keating, J., dissenting).
"Each of the policy arguments which the majority marshal against recognizing the
cause of action ... was expressly considered and rejected by this court .... Borer, 19
Cal. 3d at 453, 563 P.2d at 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 310 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
151. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337
(1982); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
seeability" to justify their conclusions, but its inadequacy was ac-
knowledged clearly in a decision refusing to extend liability:
On foreseeability, it is hardly cogent to assert that the negligent actor, if he
could foresee injury to the child ...should not also foresee at the same
time harm to the mother who, especially in the case of children of tender
years, is likely to be present or about . . But foreseeability, once recog-
nized, is not so easily limited . . .. [It] would, in short order, extend logi-
cally to caretakers other than the mother, and ultimately to affected
bystanders. 152
The same dilemma arises in deciding when to allow recovery for
accidental injury to property."1 3 The courts have no uncertainty
about taking the first steps along this path: a person should be able
to recover lost income when physically disabled from working as well
as the lost value of property that is damaged physically. But logic
cannot tell us how far to extend the "foreseeability" standard. A
capitalist may recover profits lost during the period when a capital
good was rendered inoperable,"" but workers may not claim wages
nor may local businesses or suppliers claim lost profits 155 even
though their injuries are just as "foreseeable." In rejecting liability,
one court noted that if "foreseeability be the sole test, then once
liability is extended the logic of the principle would not and could
not remain confined" and "arbitrary distinctions" would be neces-
sary. 156 In so doing, however, the court avoided one arbitrary distinc-
tion only by embracing another. Someone who owns outright a chat-
tel (such as a ship) may recover damages for the period it cannot be
used because of the negligence of another, but one who charters the
ship has no claim, though certainly it is foreseeable that ships will be
chartered.15 7 Property owners injured when negligence caused the
damming of the Buffalo River and the flooding of their premises
were allowed to recover.158 The same court, however, denied recovery
152. Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422. Another problem with the crite-
rion of foreseeability is its redundancy. It appears to consist of two principal ingredients:
the likelihood of the damage and the information cost of assessing this likelihood. But
both already have been considered in determining whether the conduct of the defendant
was negligent: the first under the heading of the probability of injury and the second
under that of the cost of avoiding the accident (P and B in the familiar formula of
Learned Hand). I see no reason why these same factors ought to be weighed twice.
153. One commentator has argued that the task of drawing boundaries is more
difficult with respect to personal integrity than with respect to economic loss ecause
"the task of defining liability limits is eased, but not eliminated, by the operation of the
laws of physics." Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectan-
cies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 61, 71 (1982). But it
seems pointless to compare degrees of impossibility.
154. See cases cited supra note 89.
155. Beck v. FMC Corp., 53 A.D.2d 118, 385 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1976), affd, 42
N.Y.2d 1027, 369 N.E.2d 10, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1977); Adams v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 37, 123 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1975).
156. Beck, 53 A.D.2d at 121-22, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
157. See supra notes 138-39.
158. Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
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to two shipowners who were prevented from unloading their cargo,
resulting in damages caused by their inability to perform contracts
calling for delivery of the cargo. Even in denying recovery, the court
conceded that:
it was a foreseeable consequence of the negligence. . . that the river would
be dammed. It would seem to follow from this that it was foreseeable that
transportation on the river would be disrupted and that some would incur
expenses because of the need to find alternative routes of transportation or
substitutes for goods delayed by the disaster.159
A purchaser who relies on the certificate of a weigher hired by the
seller can recover against the weigher if the latter negligently over-
states the weight."1 0 A creditor who relies on a balance sheet in lend-
ing money to a company that subsequently goes bankrupt cannot re-
cover against the public accountants who negligently prepared the
balance sheet,""' although damage surely is as foreseeable in one
case as it is in the other. An attorney is liable if he negligently gives
his client a written opinion intended for a third party, who relies on
it to his detriment. 62  The same attorney is not liable if he negli-
gently advises his client about the value of stock the client sells to a
third party, who relies on the erroneous advice, 63 though once again
reliance and injury seem equally foreseeable in each situation. As
Judge Cardozo ruefully admitted: "[the line of separation between
these diverse liabilities is difficult to draw. 1 64 A health insurer can-
not recover damages from a tortfeasor who negligently injures an
insured, compelling the insurer to provide medical services, for "al-
though it was reasonably foreseeable that defendant's negligence
might cause injury to [the insured], it was less foreseeable that it
would injure [the insurer's] economic interest.' 6 5 A recent exercise
380 U.S. 944 (1965).
159. Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
160. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
161. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). Bishop,
Negligent Misrepresentation Through Economists' Eyes, 96 L.Q. REV. 360 (1980), has
sought to refine the criterion of foreseeability by asking about the value of the informa-
tion, the ease with which the producer can recapture its benefits in his prices, and
whether such a price increase would discourage information production. But these re-
main continuous variables, devoid of any logical stopping place.
162. Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 901 (1976).
163. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375
(1976).
164. Glanzer, 233 N.Y. at 241, 135 N.E. at 276-77.
165. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407
(1979) (explaining the holding in Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 354 P.2d
1073, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1960)). About half the population carried insurance for hospital
in demarcation by the California Supreme Court does nothing to
clarify the boundary: "recovery for negligent interference with pro-
spective economic advantage will be limited to instances where the
risk of harm is foreseeable and is closely connected with the defen-
dant's conduct, where damages are not wholly speculative and the
injury is not part of the plaintiff's ordinary business risk." '166 But
how "closely" must the risk be connected, when are damages
"wholly" speculative, and what is an "ordinary business risk?"
Efforts to specify and explain the limits of liability for property
loss in other situations are no more satisfactory. In products liability
cases courts have had considerable difficulty deciding when manu-
facturers and sellers of defective products will be liable for property
losses. All agree that a victim can recover both income lost through
physical injury caused by the defective product and physical damage
to other property.167 But suppose only the defective product loses
value? If it also threatens some person or other property, then the
owner can recover: for example, a defective truck is involved in an
accident that endangers life or other property but damages only the
truck."6 ' If, however, the product threatens no other person or prop-
erty but simply fails to perform (with consequential economic loss)
or gradually deteriorates and loses value, there can be no recovery.169
Such a rule fails to satisfy either criterion of principled decisionmak-
ing. First, it cannot assign fact situations unambiguously to one side
of the liability boundary or the other. Suppose a purchaser of defec-
tive chicken feed suffers loss in the value of the feed purchased, in
the eggs produced (which taste bad), and in the chickens themselves
(which cease to lay). Has the defective product caused, or even
threatened, damage to something other than itself?170 Or suppose
expenses in 1950, 80% in 1968, while a third had coverage for office visits in 1962. M.
FRANKLIN, INJURIES AND REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTER-
NATIVES 478 (1971).
166. J'Aire, 24 Cal. 3d at 808, 598 P.2d at 66, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
167. Wulff v. Sprous-Reitz Co., 262 Or. 293, 498 P.2d 766 (1972) (electric blan-
ket starts fire destroying house).
168. Brownell v. White Motor Corp., 260 Or. 251, 490 P.2d 184 (1971); Russell v.
Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587, 575 P.2d 1383 (1978); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.
2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (dictum).
169. See, e.g., Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 9, 403 P.2d at 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 17; Price v.
Gatlin, 241 Or. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965) (failure of tractor to perform); State ex rel.
Western Seed v. Campbell, 250 Or. 262, 442 P.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1093 (1969) (failure of sugar beets to germinate); cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1955) (negligent manufacture
requiring purchaser to repair creates no liability without accident); but see Santor v. A
& M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). Although the Oregon cases
had experimented with another criterion-whether the damage was the result of an "ac-
cident"-they soon dropped it as unworkable.
170. The court in Brown v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 268 Or. 470, 521 P.2d 537
(1974), ruled no. But the majority implicitly may have overruled earlier decisions
(Brownell and Wulf) by suggesting that personal integrity must be endangered. Yet this
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that a homeowner covers a house with paint that fails to protect it
from rot: has the defective product caused damage to other prop-
erty? 171 Second, the distinction between allowing recovery for dam-
age to other persons or property (actual or threatened), but not for
the failure of the product to perform is not justified in terms of a
larger social value. It cannot be maintained, as one court argued,
that personal injuries always are more catastrophic to victims than
property losses.172 Furthermore, the rule makes liability depend on
threatened danger, whereas tort law deals only with actual injuries
and does not impose liability for mere risks. 7 3 "Negligence is not a
tort unless it results in the commission of a wrong . . . . [To argue
otherwise] is to ignore the fundamental difference between tort and
crime. ' ' 74 The rule fails to explain why identical injuries should pro-
duce different legal results depending on how the harm occurs. A
defective car overturns, injuring the salesman driving it. The sales-
man loses income as a result and is allowed to recover for the loss. If
the salesman emerges unscathed but the accident renders the car in-
operable, depriving the salesman of the identical income, he does not
recover. If the car overturns, endangering but not injuring the sales-
man and rendering the car inoperable, the salesman can recover. If a
defective burglar alarm in the car short-circuits the electrical sys-
tem, rendering the car inoperable, it is uncertain whether the sales-
interpretation was rejected, at least in dictum, by the later case of Russell. The dissent in
Brown argued that it would be logical to limit strict liability
[tio damage for personal injuries, [footnote omitted] but it is incomprehensible
to me to say that a product must constitute a risk of injury to human life
before recovery will be allowed for property damage, even though in the partic-
ular instance in which the property damage occurred no person suffered any
harm.
Brown, 268 Or. at 484, 521 P.2d at 543 (O'Connell, C.J., dissenting).
171. See Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 25, 403 P.2d at 155-56, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28
(Peters, J., dissenting).
172. "The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming
misfortune to the person injured .... " Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45
Cal. Rptr. at 23 (quoting Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150
P.2d 436, 441 (1944)). But some personal injuries are not overwhelming misfortunes,
while some property losses are. Id. at 25, 403 P.2d at 155, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 27 (Peters, J.,
dissenting). The majority in Seely did not explain why recovery is allowed where only
property damage occurs.
173. This sounds suspiciously like the discredited rule in In re an Arbitration be-
tween Polemis and Another and Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd., [1921] 3 K.B. 560: "[I]f
the act would or might probably cause damage, the fact that the damage it in fact causes
is not the exact kind of damage one would expect is immaterial."
174. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 345-46 162 N.E. 99, 101
(1928).
man recovers.175
The difficulties that tort law encounters in drawing and rational-
izing boundaries cannot be resolved by means of contract analogies.
Recovery in cases in which the tortfeasor contracts with someone
other than the victim to render services that injure the victim often
depends upon whether the victim is a third-party beneficiary of the
contract. But since the application of that doctrine turns on whether
the court imputes to the tortfeasor a fictitious intent to benefit the
victim, it simply substitutes one arbitrary and unjustified distinction
for another. Nor can the law of implied warranties alleviate the un-
certainty of products liability because it offers no principled basis for
deciding what warranties should be implied176 or what kind of priv-
ity, if any, should be required between the party sought to be held
liable and the ultimate victim.
I see no way to avoid the conclusion that the boundary between
liability and nonliability in cases involving economic loss is "all a
question of expediency.' ' 7 Even Holmes, the greatest American
common law judge, could do no better than the ipse dixit: "the law
does not spread its protection so far"'17---a confession of analytic de-
spair that lesser judges continue to cite as adequate authority in
cases where they are unable to offer persuasive reasons for their ac-
tions.178 But this abdication of responsibility is intolerable. The legit-
imacy of liberal legalism rests ultimately on the ability of judges to
justify their exercise of power by reference to rules. The only way
tort law can regain its pretensions to principled decisionmaking is by
ceasing to protect property against accidental damage.
175. Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 22, 403 P.2d at 153-54, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26 (Peters,
J., dissenting); see also M. FRANKLIN, INJURIES AND REMEDIES 561-62 (2d ed. 1979). As
courts never tire of repeating: "The precise manner of the event need not be anticipated."
Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 414 N.E.2d 666, 434 N.Y.S.2d
166 (1980).
176. You can always imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply
it? It is because of some belief as to the practice of a community or of a class,
or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude of
yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative measurement, and there-
fore not capable of founding exact logical conclusions. Such matters really are
battle grounds, where the means do not exist for determinations that shall be
good, for all time, and where the decision can do no more than embody the
preference of a given body in a given time and place.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897).
177. Kinsman, 388 F.2d at 825 (quoting Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 354-55, 162 N.E.
at 104 (Andrews, J., dissenting)).
178. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927).
179. See, e.g., Kinsman, 388 F.2d at 823 (Kaufman, J.); Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at
181, 174 N.E. at 448 (Cardozo, C.J.).
116
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CONCLUSION
Let me summarize my analysis thus far. I began by exploring the
implications of the values of autonomy, equality, and community.
Property is not fundamental to human autonomy in the same way
that physical and emotional integrity are. But to the extent that
ownership is an expression of selfhood, it can be argued that respect
for the autonomy of property owners requires that they bear the risk
of accidental loss as part of the broad dominion over their property
they enjoy under capitalism. Protecting the unequal distribution of
property against accidental loss obscures our essential human equal-
ity and extends the contingent and illegitimate inequality of property
from the realm of economy to that of polity. It also undermines com-
munity, which is built on the consciousness of what unites people and
which only can be mobilized to protect against and redress harm to
the collectivity, not to the individual. Anticipatory prevention, para-
mount when personal integrity is at stake, is not so clearly superior
to retroactive compensation for property losses because property
owners can be restored to the status quo ante in a way that personal
injury victims cannot. But when tort law does compensate property
loss it preserves an unequal distribution of property by regressive
means. It translates superior wealth and income into entitlements to
political power and public services and reproduces a symbolic uni-
verse that affirms the rightness of the existing distribution of wealth
and power. Tort law, itself, rejects the analogy between personal in-
tegrity and property loss by according the latter significantly less
protection. State action has enormous potential to affect property in-
terests inadvertently, both to enhance values and to depress them.
But such action often is unprincipled and more solicitous of those
who enjoy wealth and power, sometimes explicitly reflecting funda-
mental social cleavages. When judges extend tort protection to prop-
erty, the rules they purport to follow cannot be applied consistently
and are not grounded in accepted social values.
What, then, can be said on behalf of tort damages for property
loss? The weakest argument for liability rests on a concern for what
Calabresi calls secondary accident costs-the dislocation experienced
by whomever has to bear the loss.18 The problem with this variable
is its indeterminacy; rarely can we assert with confidence that either
victims or tortfeasors, as a category, are able to spread the loss bet-
180. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALY-
SIS 39 (1970).
ter by insuring or self-insuring and by passing the costs on to the
customers of a product or service."' If the analysis of secondary
costs is inconclusive, the lesson of tertiary costs is clear. Because of
the high transaction costs of transferring losses from victims to
tortfeasors, 1 2 strong arguments must be advanced against leaving
losses where they fall. The victim is in a better position to insure
because he is better able to estimate the value of the property at
risk.1 83 Leaving the loss on the victim will avoid the waste and ineffi-
ciency of multiple insurance by the property owner and each of a
large number of potentially liable tortfeasors. Unlike the victim of
personal injury (who may be indigent), the owner of property at risk
always has the means to insure it.184 Consequently, it seems appro-
priate that those who enjoy property should bear the cost of protect-
ing it against loss.1811 Perhaps we can clarify our attitude toward
compensating the victims of property loss by asking whether we
would endorse a regime of true strict or enterprise liability or a sys-
tem of social insurance directed toward this purpose.
But what of the other goals of tort law: the reduction of primary
accident costs and the promotion of justice? I do not think the case
for either is sufficiently strong to overcome the arguments advanced
181. The law of products liability is predicated on a belief that we can make this
generalization about consumers as contrasted with manufacturers and sellers:
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its
consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk
of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public
as a cost of doing business.
Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J. concurring). For instance, when
two cars are involved in a collision or a fire spreads from one house to another, it is not
possible to predict which car or house owner is better able to bear the loss or more likely
to be insured.
182. The costs of operating a liability insurance system are about 120% of the
benefits ultimately received by victims; the comparable costs for a private loss insurance
system are about 20%. Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63
Micn. L. REv. 279, 290-91 (1964); cf. T. ISON, THE FORENSIc LOTrERY 205-210 (1979).
183. C. MORRIS & C.R. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 235 (2d ed. 1980); Levmore,
Self-Assessed Valuation in Systems for Tort and Other law, 68 VA. L. REv. 771 (1982).
184. 1 believe this statement requires only minor qualification. Most people own no
more than two major assets: their homes and their cars. With respect to both, the cost of
property loss insurance (not liability insurance) is a tiny fraction of the total cost of
ownership. Similarly, the cost of insuring a future income stream is a tiny fraction of
that income. Any hardship to the poorest would be alleviated by guaranteeing minimum
entitlements to essential property and minimum income.
185. Torts scholars, especially advocates of economic analysis, frequently argue
that it is necessary to deny the victim compensation in order to motivate him to worry
about his own safety. This belief justifies doctrines of contributory negligence, assump-
tion of risk, and comparative fault. "If the damages fully compensated the victim he
would be indifferent between being injured and not being injured .... " R. POSNER,
ECONoMc ANALYSIS OF LAW 85-86 (1972). This is a false and dangerous proposition
with respect to personal injury, which never can be "fully compensated." But it is more
plausible with respect to property loss, especially since the owner may be the cheaper
primary accident cost avoider.
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above. Even without tort liability for property damage, many power-
ful safety incentives remain: fear of suffering personal injury (which
never can be compensated adequately), fear of incurring property
loss oneself (which now will not be compensated at all), 8 6 fear of
liability for causing personal injury, altruistic concern for the per-
sonal integrity and property of others, and the pervasive influence of
reciprocity (fear that the person threatened or injured will be less
solicitous of one's own safety or may withdraw from an ongoing, mu-
tually beneficial, relationship). With respect to retributive justice,
many of these same mechanisms also impose significant punishments
on the tortfeasor. It is not clear that accidents causing property loss
warrant greater punishment. Finally, regulatory and criminal laws
will continue to promote safety and punish the infliction of both risk
(which tort liability ignores) and injury.
Although the goals of optimum safety and moral judgment must
command universal respect, a stronger retort to their invocation is
the overwhelming evidence that the present system of tort liability
cannot be taken seriously as a mechanism of either control or pun-
ishment. Whether evaluated sociologically as a means of deterrence
or ethically as a system of distributive justice, sanctions must satisfy
two criteria: certainty and proportionality. However, the percentage
of compensable injuries that lead to tort claims is notoriously low, 187
186. In an earlier article, I argued that tort liability for personal injury should be
replaced by social insurance providing income maintenance at some minimum level to-
gether with medical care. See Abel, supra note 2. If that recommendation were followed,
as well as those proposed in the present Article, we would lose the deterrent value of tort
liability altogether. I am not convinced that this would invite an unacceptable level of
negligent behavior. In addition to the other influences discussed in the Article, there are
the disincentives provided by the market (a reputation for dangerous products), the me-
dia, and regulatory and criminal law. On the other hand, even if civil litigation is not an
efficient deterrent by itself, it does engender responses in the market, the media, and the
regulatory apparatus, and this stimulus would be missing.
187. Studies of tort claims (the equivalent of victimization studies in the criminal
law) are few and fragmentary. Except for automobile accidents, where the defendant is
an anonymous, insured stranger (R. HUNTING & G. NEUWIRTH, supra note 9), all inves-
tigators concur that only a tiny fraction of compensable injuries lead to claims. E.g.,
ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 10; P. ATIYAH, supra note 10, at 217-30; Burman, Genn
& Lyons, The Use of Legal Services by Victims of Accidents in the Home-A Pilot
Study, 40 MOD. L. REV. 47 (1977); D. HARRIS, M. MACLEAN, H. GENN, S. LLOYD-
BOSTOCK, P. FENN. P. CORFIELD & Y. BRITTAN, COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILL-
NESS AND INJURY (1984); Abel, 9's of Cure, Ounces of Protection (Book Review), 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1003 (1985); H. GENN, supra note 10; A. BLOEMBERGEN & P. VAN
WERSCH, VERKEERSSLACHTOFFERS EN HUN SCHADE (1973); A. BLOEMBERGEN, supra
note 4; B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (1977); B. ABEL-SMITH, M.
ZANDER, & R. BROOKE, LEGAL PROBLEMS AND THE CITIZEN (1973); Morris & Paul,
The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 913 (1962); Miller
and there is reason to believe that those who incur property losses
make claims even less frequently than those who suffer personal in-
juries.""' The frequency of claims as a percentage of injuries also is
very unevenly distributed, so that there is much greater incentive to
protect some forms of property and some property owners than
others. The institution of insurance, together with liberal interpreta-
tions of the doctrines of respondeat superior and proximate cause, all
of which serve to enhance the likelihood that a property owner will
be compensated, simultaneously dissipate much of the deterrent ef-
fect of tort liability. The considerable ambiguity of the substantive
law 89 renders outcomes uncertain, discourages claimants, and in-
vites those who create risks to hope they will escape liability. The
penalty is proportioned not only to the iniquity of the actor's conduct
(as distributive justice requires) but also to the magnitude of the
damages that fortuitously transpire and to judgments about the vic-
tim's own conduct. Concern for compensation frequently leads courts
to impose liability on the party best able to make good the loss
rather than on the one whose conduct merits control and
punishment.
The justification of tort liability as a system of control and punish-
ment seems to me to typify a pervasive hypocrisy. Our social system
encourages, even compels, "undesirable" behavior by creating a nor-
mative order that purports to disapprove of such behavior but actu-
ally is ambivalent and maintaining an institutional structure that
purports to control the behavior but uses sanctions that are rare,
avoidable, unpredictable, and weak. Thus we can indulge in the lux-
ury of high moral sentiments and fidelity to the ideal of safety (even
"optimum" safety) while continuing to enjoy the benefits of a system
that consistently disregards both, even condemns them. Examples of
this hypocrisy abound. Capitalism mandates that entrepreneurs
spend as little on safety as possible but then occasionally punishes a
tortfeasor for "reckless disregard" of safety. 190 In order to maximize
& Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 525 (1980-81); J. FITZGERALD, A COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
POTENTIAL DISPUTES IN AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES (1982).
188. In a 1973 sample of 548 low-income respondents in Sydney, Australia, 62%
of those who suffered physical injury in an automobile accident (N=21) consulted a
lawyer but only 23% of those who suffered property damage in an automobile accident
did so (N =77). M. CASS & R. SACKVILLE, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR 90 (1975).
In a representative sample of 2064 adults in the United States in 1973-1974, 340 in-
stances of personal injury were taken to lawyers for every 1000 experienced, whereas
only 80 instances of property damage were taken to lawyers for every 1000 experienced.
B. CURRAN, supra note 187, at 145.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 140-79.
190. See, e.g., Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc., 95 Cal. App. 3d 279,
157 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1979) (punitive damages imposed in slip and fall because defendant's
"minimum-expense operation" showed callous disregard for customer safety); Soucy v.
Greyhound Corp., 27 A.D.2d 112, 276 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1967) (bus involved in accident
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the profits of their shareholders, insurers must pay as few claims as
possible, but sometimes an insurer will be punished for breaching its
duty to the insured. g19 Professions aggressively strive for dominance
over their clients but then proclaim high-sounding ethical codes and
punish the practitioner who is too crude in violating them.192 Both
regulatory and criminal law are riddled with examples of conduct
that is commonplace because society generously rewards it but si-
multaneously declares it to be illegal and punishes it conspicuously if
haphazardly. Illustrations include conspiracies to restrain trade and
reduce competition, the emission of pollutants and other threats to
the environment, the production and distribution of unsafe consumer
products and services, workplace dangers, the drug trade, prostitu-
tion, and so forth.
We can test the seriousness of our commitment to using liability
rules to control and punish damage to property by asking whether
we would want to adopt a regime of strict liability in order to in-
crease the number of claims and the likelihood of their success.
Much of the recent literature on torts has argued that the reduction
of primary accident costs should be our highest priority. This writing
assumes that liability rules (whether fault-based or strict) are the
best way of achieving primary accident cost reduction. I share the
goal, but I find the empirical evidence for the instrumental value of
liability rules to be weak and unconvincing. 9 3 Rather than continue
had travelled more than 600,000 miles and tires were "so worn that the fabric was
exposed").
191. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1967) (refusal by liability insurer to accept settlement within policy limits
when liability likely and actual damages greatly exceeded policy, justifies award to in--
sured for mental suffering); Danaher v. Partridge Creek Country Club, 116 Mich. App.
305, 323 N.W.2d 376 (1982); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980,
148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978) (punitive damages against loss insurer for refusal to pay full
value of uninsured motorist policy). A Los Angeles jury recently awarded $40.5 million
in punitive damages against Allstate Insurance Co. and its claims adjuster for refusing to
pay a $30,000 claim under an uninsured motorist policy. L.A. Times, Nov. 10, 1983, §
II, at 1, col. 4.
192. For insight into the way in which lawyers seek professional dominance, see
Abel, Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1117; on the promul-
gation and non-enforcement of ethical rules, see Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate
Ethical Rules?, 59 TEx. L. REV. 639 (1981).
193. Cf. T. ISON, THE FORENSIC LOTTERY 89 (1967). Doubts about the efficacy of
tort liability rules in shaping behavior have infiltrated even the heartland of deterrence
theory, the University of Chicago. See Epstein, Automobile No-Fault Plans: A Second
Look at First Principles, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 769, 785 n.31 (1980); Epstein, The
Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1717 (1982); see also
Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 163 (1974). O'Connell,
supra note 4, at 618-19, also observes that a number of empirical studies have revealed
elaborating rules whose benefits are uncertain and whose costs are
known to be enormous, it makes more sense to choose paths along
which we know we can advance. Our legal regime should reflect the
ideals of autonomy, equality, and community. State action should
refrain from preserving or legitimizing the existing distribution of
property. And tort law should eliminate arbitrary, unprincipled
distinctions.
For these reasons I conclude that tort law should cease to protect
property against accidental damage.194 Naturally I am concerned
about personal injuries affecting the victim's capacity to earn a liv-
ing, but I think this problem is .best handled by a system of social
insurance that guarantees everyone some minimum entitlement. I
also am troubled by intentional and reckless threats and damage to
property, but the criminal law is the appropriate means of control-
ling and punishing such antisocial behavior. My position is not par-
ticularly radical. Property owners still would be able to protect their
entitlements through contracts (which might make explicit provision
for the rights currently derived from notions of third-party benefi-
ciary and implied warranty), by insurance, and by avoiding or reduc-
ing risks to their property. This proposal would effect no major
change in the distribution of wealth or power, although enjoyment of
property would become more expensive. It would not threaten capi-
talism. Indeed, my proposal may have greater ideological affinity
with laissez-faire economics than with socialist ideals. 195 There are a
few identifiable interest groups that stand to lose-personal injury
lawyers, for instance-but they have no real power base, notwith-
standing their successful defense of the status quo in recent years.196
Private insurance companies are likely to make as much money writ-
ing loss insurance as they have writing liability insurance.197 Courts
little or no effect and that the adoption of no-fault automobile insurance schemes has not
increased the level of car accidents. On whether a movement from fault-based liability
rules to no-fault recovery through loss insurance would result in a loss of deterrence, see
the dialogue between Landes, Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and
Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents, 25 J. L. EcoN. 44 (1982),
and O'Connell & Levmore, A Reply to Landes: A Faulty Study of No-Fault's Effect on
Fault, 38 Mo. L. REv. 649 (1983). See also Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73
CALIF. L. REv. 555 (1985); Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand
Experience, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 976 (1985).
194. In the American context, there is a question whether this might require
amendment of some state constitutions. See J. O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at App. V. Of
course, this is not a problem in the United Kingdom.
195. For an example of such economic analysis, see Epstein, Medical Malpractice:
The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 87. I would not endorse his
ideas where the victim suffers personal injury. See also Priest, A Theory of the Con-
sumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981).
196. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 158-59.
197. Indeed, a number of major insurance companies and trade associations sup-
port no-fault plans. See J. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 158 nn.4-5; J. O'CONNELL, END-
ING INSULT TO INJURY, 115 n.16 (1975). However, O'Connell recently revised his san-
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cannot be attacked for judicial activism because they will be narrow-
ing rights, not expanding them; indeed, they can claim to be re-
sponding to the outcry against "litigiousness." 198 All they need to do
is reject the false analogy between personal integrity and property
and acknowledge that the state should not use liability rules to pro-
tect the latter against accidental loss.
guine view of the insurance industry, noting that only the District of Columbia has
adopted a no-fault plan since 1975. Instead, he sees corporate defendants who pay the
premiums of insurance companies as a primary force for change. O'Connell, supra note
4, at 595, 597, 627-30.
198. Galanter, Reading The Landscape Of Disputes: What We Know And Don't
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious And Litigious Society,
31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983).

